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Abstract
Malicious logic, specifically worms cost network users an enormous amount of
time and money. Worms, like Slammer and Code Red, infect thousands of systems and
denied whole networks access to the Internet. This research examines the ability of the
original Slammer worm, a Slammer based routing worm, and a new Single Slash Eight
(SSE) routing worm to infect vulnerable systems within a given address space. The
ability of Slammer to generate a uniform random IP addresses in a given address space is
established. Finally, a comparison of the speed increase from a worm on a computing
system in 2003 to those available today is performed.
Both the Slammer based routing worm and the SSE routing worm spread faster
than the original Slammer. The random number generator of the original Slammer worm
generates a statistically uniform distribution of addresses within the range under test.
Furthermore, despite the previous research into the speed of worm propagation, there is
still a need to test worms on the current systems. The speed of the computing systems
that the worms operated on in the past were more than three times slower than today’s
systems. As the speed of computer systems continue to grow, the speed of worm
propagation should increase with it as their scan rates directly relate to their infection
rate. As such, any inherent immunity of an IPv6 network from scanning worms should
be reexamined.
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ANALYSIS OF ROUTING WORM INFECTION RATES ON AN IPV4
NETWORK

I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The dream of one world, one community has all but become a reality as a
network of computers now connects the world both virtually and physically via the
Internet. Though originally implemented as a way to share information between
universities, the Internet has grown to encompass every nation. This has allowed for an
amazing sharing of information and resources across the globe. However, with this great
good also comes the bad. The global community’s interconnectedness and reliance on
the Internet has led to many using the Internet for nefarious purposes. There are people
using the Internet to perform corporate espionage, steal identities, and in general, create
havoc. To that end, one of the most costly sources of this havoc for businesses and users
alike on the Internet is malicious logic. Of all the forms of malicious logic, computer
worms have shown themselves to be one of the most costly for the Internet community.
Worms can infect thousands of systems in just minutes. These fast infection rates
reduce or eliminate the access of large corporations to the average person to Internet
services. Slammer, also known as Sapphire and SQL Slammer, was one of the fastest
worms ever released onto the Internet. As shown in Figure 1, Slammer spread
throughout the world in just minutes. This figure identifies the areas of the world
infected by Slammer in less than 30 minutes [MPW03]. The blue infection circles do not
accurately represent the number of systems infected per area, but identifies the areas
1

covered in order to limit the overlap with adjacent zones [MPW03]. This coverage is
consistent with every major technological center and city across the globe and illustrates
how interconnected the world was in 2003. Since then, the global community has grown
larger and even more interconnected.

Figure 1. Slammer Global Infection
Mi2g, a London based market intelligence firm, calculated that the Slammer
worm caused “between $950 Million and $1.2 Billion in lost productivity in its first five
days” of operation worldwide [Lem03]. Even so, Slammer was just another in a line of
costly malicious actors–the estimated costs of Code Red, the LoveLetter virus, and the
Klaz virus were $2.6 Billion, $8.8 Billion, and $9.0 Billion, respectively. These costs
include damage directly caused by the malicious code and the administrative costs to
correct the infected systems, including the initial cleansing and repair of the systems.
Companies must now maintain a constant vigil against malicious actors by keeping staff
updated and equipment protected against future attacks. However, the largest financial
impact is the loss of the ability to conduct business [Lem03].
2

The large financial impact of these various malicious logics show organizations
need to analyze their operation and capabilities to detect and even prevent future attacks.
Researchers and the computing community must understand the operation of malicious
logic to provide an effective detection, prevention, and response to future attacks.
1.2 Overview and Goals
This research determines through the use of mathematical simulation and live
analysis of malicious code on an infected system, whether the Slammer based routing
worm proposed by Zou is faster than the previously observed Slammer worm [ZTG05].
This research also determines through those same simulations and analyses whether the
Single Slash Eight (SSE) routing worm proposed in this research is faster than the
Slammer based routing worm proposed by Zou [ZTG05]. A third goal of this research is
to analyze the statistical randomness of the IP addresses generated by the Slammer worm
to establish a basis for the use of random number generators in the mathematical models
used to generate infection rates. As part of the validation effort, the Matlab mathematical
model simulation is compared to previously observed Slammer data. The final goal of
this research is to compare the various 2003 scanning worm infection, the year Slammer
was originally released, to the speed that could be possible on computing systems of
today.
1.3 Thesis Overview
Chapter 1 provides a brief synopsis of the motivation for this research, an
overview of the experiment, the goals of the research, and an overview of the thesis
structure. Chapter 2 covers the basics of malicious logic operation with particular
3

emphasis on worms and delves into the previous research conducted in the area of
worms. Modeling of the Internet, Internet protocol addressing, and the concept of the
continual increase of computing system speed are also addressed.
A detailed explanation of the experimental design is provided in Chapter 3
including the problem definition with the goals and hypothesis, the experimental
approach, and the assumptions and limitations for this research. Chapter 3 also discusses
the system boundaries and services, the workload for the system, and performance
metrics used in this research. The parameters and factors that form the basis of this
research are also discussed. Finally, the evaluation technique, experiment design and
configuration, and a discussion of the analysis and interpretation for this research are
discussed.
The results and analysis of the data collected are presented in Chapter 4. The first
section determines the packet generation capabilities of the original Slammer worm. The
second section analyzes the randomness of the Slammer worm IP address generation.
The third section determines the infection rates of the original Slammer worm and the
Slammer routing worm proposed by Zou [ZTG05]. Chapter 4 demonstrates the speed
difference between the worms on systems available today compared to that in use during
the original Slammer worm outbreak. Chapter 4 ends with the coverage of the Single
Slash Eight routing worm developed herein.
Chapter 5 is a short summary of the research problem and conclusions. The
contributions and significance to the computing community and recommendations for
future research are also contained in Chapter 5.

4

Throughout this thesis to improve the readability and flow, the research cited
directly in the thesis text is referred to by the last name of the first author credited in that
research. As such, the research performed and data created by Zou et al [ZTG05] in their
research of routing worms will be referred to simply as Zou. The Slammer worm
research completed by Wei et al [WMS05] is referred to as Wei and so on. There are
two Slammer analyses cited in this research that were completed by Moore et al [MPS03]
[MPW03] where the same authors wrote both documents. Both of these are referred
within the text by simply Moore however, the end citation specifically names which
research the information came from.
1.4 Summary
This chapter provides a brief synopsis of the motivation for this research with an
introduction to the significant impact caused by malicious logic. The goals, with an
overview, of the experiment for this thesis was provided in Section 1.2. Finally, an
overview of the structure of this document was presented in Section 1.3.

5

II. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the fundamentals of worm propagation and recent research
into worm propagation and modeling. Section 2.2 discusses the basics of computer
worms and their operation when released onto a network, as well as a more detailed
analysis of the routing worms being assessed in the experiment. Section 2.3 investigates
the difficult process of accurately simulating the Internet. The discussion of the division
of Internet addresses is given in Section 2.4. Within Section 2.5, the concept of Moore’s
law as it relates to the increasing speed of computing systems is examined. Section 2.6
discusses previous worm propagation modeling, results, and limitations. Finally, Section
2.7 summarizes all of the previous sections.
2.2 Worms
This research considers the operation of random address scanning computer
worms across an IPv4 network. One of the major reasons computer worms work so well
is that Microsoft Windows, the operating system used throughout the world, has a market
share of 94% [Fes04]. This homogeneity, or genetically similar software makeup, has
both negative consequences and provides the consumer great benefits. The benefits
include lower cost products, easier portability and increased services. The consequences
associated with this homogeneity are the ease with which a malicious logic program can
move from system to system.
The cost of malicious logic to consumers, companies, and the government is the
motivation for this research. It is estimated that computer virus attacks caused $55
6

billion in damages in 2003 and that sum was on the rise in 2004 [Mar04]. With the costs
from the damages skyrocketing and money to prevent and protect against malicious logic
becoming a mandatory expenditure, one can easily see that malicious logic is and has
been a serious threat to home computer users, businesses, and the Internet community in
general.
Dr. Fred Cohen coined the term “computer virus” in 1984 due to the similarity to
their biological counterparts plaguing the human race [Sla95]. His research formed the
basis for the epidemiological models. If system A can infect system B, and system B can
infect system C then system A can infect system C [KeW91]. Since that initial
comparison, a virus has been defined as “a set of instructions which, when executed,
spreads itself to other, previously unaffected, programs or files” [Hof90]. However, this
does not fully define malicious code, as some malicious code requires a user to open an
attachment or possibly an email. In these cases the user is not “directly” acting upon the
code; they are activating the “trigger” (e.g., the opening of an attachment). A more
complete definition of malicious logic is a program that “modifies or destroys data, steals
data, allows unauthorized access, exploits or damages a system” [Hei04] and in general
“does something that the user did not intend” [Hei04].
Although, computer viruses are not “living” entities with the ability to build up
“immunities,” the programmers of malicious logic are becoming better at creating and
writing malicious code. This, in effect, makes the viruses more resilient to correction,
detection and prevention, and more tenacious in their ability to infect new systems. This
problem of evolution makes defending against and defeating malicious code more
difficult with every new generation and makes computer viruses similar in that sense to
7

their biological counterparts [ZTG05]. Given that expectation, each worm’s infection
rate should be faster than the last; the SSE routing worm should be faster than the
Slammer based routing worm which should be faster than the original Slammer worm.
Worms are often confused with viruses. This confusion is due to the merging of
malicious code techniques and the blurring of the lines between application operations.
Worms, unlike viruses, have tended in the past to not directly harm the system they are
on. Worms replicated in the background and most computers continued to operate. The
Witty worm was an exception to this. It contained code that randomly deleted portions of
a hard drive attached to the system it was residing on [ShM04]. Even so, all worms are
malicious actors. First, worms perform actions not intended by the owner of the system.
Worms often increase in size filling up a hard drive, perform data mining, and can bring
Internet communication to a standstill through the flooding of the Internet with
overwhelming amounts of infected packets.
A proper definition of a worm is a form of malicious code, either standalone or
file infecting, that acts with or without human intervention and spreads across a network
[KiE03]. This simple definition combines all the aspects of a worm while separating it
from a virus or a Trojan horse. A Trojan Horse is a set of malicious code that is hidden
within another program, much like the mythical Trojan Horse of the Greeks. Viruses
differ from worms in that, a worm does not attach directly to another object or program;
worms are standalone code. Worms, unlike Trojan horses, replicate for further infections
[KiE03].
Worms can be classified into three groups based on how they operate: E- mail (or
client application) worms, Windows file sharing worms, and traditional worms [KiE03].
8

E- mail worms, as the name suggests, exploit weaknesses in an e- mail system or in
application software to propagate (e.g., Melissa [KiE03] used e- mail, and Bilbrog
[KiE03] used Internet Relay Chat). This style of worm usually requires some form of
user action, such as opening an e- mail attachment. Windows file sharing worms exploit
the various file sharing capabilities (i.e., Server Message Block and Common Internet
File System) of Windows that allow small groups to work on the same files (e.g., Nimda
and Gaobot worms [KiE03]). Traditional worms attack using standard Internet protocols
(e.g., TCP/IP, UDP) and operate autonomously once activated [KiE03]. Within this class
of traditional worms are the scanning worms. Code Red, Slammer, Witty, and the
Slammer based routing worm proposed by Zou are all types of scanning worms [ZTG05].
They all probe the available IP address space to find and infect vulnerable systems
[ZTG05].
2.2.1 Pseudo Random Number Generation in Worms

All scanning worms use some form of Pseudo Random Number Generation
(PRNG). As the name implies, a PRNG generates pseudo random numbers for use in
various applications. The problem with PRNG is that it is not a truly random process but
rather an algorithm that generates a sequence of numbers with little or no discernable
pattern present in the sequence [Bla06]. This means that no matter how random the
numbers generated appear to be, they are predictable. Thus, if a person knows the
number that “seeded” the PRNG they will be able to predict the series of numbers
generated by the algorithm [Haa99]. However, for the purpose of generating a varied
distribution of numbers to be used as target addresses, the PRNG works well as has been
shown by the speed at which the worms studied in this research propagate.
9

2.2.2 Code Red

Code Red was released on the Internet at 1000 hrs UTC on 13 July 2001 and
exploited a vulnerability in the Windows Internet Information Services (IIS) that was
discovered almost a month earlier by eEye [MSB02]. Windows IIS is a web server
architecture for managing website and application availability. The vulnerability was an
error in the Window IIS Indexing Services that allowed a remote intruder to run arbitrary
code on the victim system [CER02]. Code Red had an error in its random number
generator that limited its ability to scan for IP addresses and so its propagation speed was
inadvertently restricted. Code Red version II (hereafter called Code Red as the two
versions operated identically other than the random number generator), released six days
after Code Red, corrected this coding error in the random number generator and infected
systems at an exponential rate. Code Red generated 100 scanning threads; each thread
randomly selected an IP address and tried to set up a connection on port 80. Code Red
was programmed to scan the IP address space uniformly [MSB02].
An unusual characteristic of the scanning threads was that the 100th thread would
try to deface the currently infected system’s web site if it was an English Windows 2000
system. If the target of the 100th thread was not an English Windows 2000 system, the
thread would be used to infect other systems rather than trying to deface the web site.
Once infected, the system would become a platform for launching new attacks. If the
target system was not a web server or it could not be infected, the thread would generate
a new random IP address and try again [MSB02].
The Code Red worm could only infect a Windows system with IIS installed. At
the time, Microsoft estimated there were six million Windows IIS servers on the Internet.
10

However, Code Red was programmed with a stop time and did not have the opportunity
to infect the entire population. It stopped its propagation at 0000 hrs UTC on 19 July
2001 after infecting an estimated 359,000 computers in less than 14 hours. The cost of
this worm was estimated to be in excess of $2.6 billion [MSB02].
As Code Red was, at the time, one of the most aggressive worms observed, there
have been many experiments and research projects analyzing its operation. Code Red
was one of the worms used by Zou as a basis for validating the speed of their proposed
routing worms. The Zou routing worm research is discussed in more detail in Section
2.2.4 [ZTG05].
2.2.3 Slammer

Slammer, also known as SQL Slammer and Sapphire, did not attack the end
system computers (i.e., the personal home computer), but it wreaked havoc by virtually
shutting down portions of the Internet as it spread itself among the core servers and
throughout Internet [HyE03]. Core servers provide Internet access for multiple
computers at a company or small network. Of the 13 Internet root name servers, the
servers that form the essence of the domain name system, five were shutdown by
Slammer traffic and close to 20% of all data sent across the Internet was lost during the
outbreak [HyE03]. Slammer was the fastest spreading worm ever observed [MPS03]. It
doubled the number of infected systems every 7.5 – 9.5 seconds in the first minute and
managed to infect over 90% of its potential 75,000 victims in about 10 minutes [MPS03].
Slammer operated by exploiting a “buffer overflow” vulnerability in the
Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Operating System by gaining access to the computer
memory stack and replicating itself. Slammer sent massive amounts of data across the
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Internet during its attempt to infect other systems; reaching over 55 million scans per
second in just three minutes [MPS03]. The small size of Slammer added to its
effectiveness by allowing it to be sent in a short time. This small size provided an
additional benefit of initially hiding its existence since the large file transfers prevalent on
the Internet masked its presence. Even with the small size of 404 bytes, the amount of
data being sent across the Internet by Slammer during the three minute interval was over
23,000 gigabytes every second.
Also aiding Slammer’s effectiveness was its use of User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) for communication [HyE03]. UDP allows transmission with no requirement to
establish a return path acknowledgement. This meant Slammer could scan the Internet
without concern for establishing a connection to the targets, thereby further increasing its
speed. The consequences could have been much worse; Slammer had a small flaw in its
program that limited the number of Internet system addresses it could scan for infection
[MPS03]. However, this did not appear to impact the speed at which Slammer was able
to spread. This flaw did, however, limit the ability of researchers to calculate the IP
address range vulnerable to the Slammer worm, as they had been able to do with previous
worms [MPS03].
2.2.4 The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and /8 Routing Worms

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and “/8” routing worms are malicious code
proposed by Zou [ZTG05]. These worms are an advanced form of malicious code using
two techniques to increase their speed of infecting vulnerable systems and creating an
overload of malicious packet traffic on the Internet backbone.
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The BGP routing worm is, as the name implies, a scanning of the BGP routing
tables for valid computer addresses to attack. The BGP routing worm is named after the
protocol used by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) of various tier sizes as their interautonomous system routing protocol to exchange information between ISPs. The BGP
routers contain ISP IP addresses, and Zou proposed an autonomous worm that harvests
valid IP address tables from the BGP routers. Thus, this makes the BGP routing worm a
more precise Internet scannerand should be at least three times faster than any previous
worm [ZTG05]. The second capability of a BGP routing worm is the ability to attack,
say, only a specific country, company, Internet service provider, due to the inherent
geographical information in routing tables [ZTG05].
The “/8” routing worm implements similar techniques with one difference from
the BGP routing worm. Instead of a large block of code to query the BGP routers for
their prefixes to hone the worm’s search, the “/8” routing worm is pre-coded with the 116
IPv4 “/8” routable addresses. This reduces the amount of code required and therefore the
size compared to the BGP routing worm. Inserting the 116 IPv4 “/8” routable address
prefixes would only increase Slammer’s size by 116 bytes to 520 bytes [ZTG05]. The
code to perform this modification was not available in published research.
Due to the public availability of the BGP routing tables, developing an effective
worm is comparatively easy because the tables provide a known good range of Internet
protocol addresses to attack which make the worm spread more effectively by reducing
the required scanning space without the risk of missing a target. As of September 2003,
over 28% of the IPv4 addresses were BGP routable, reducing the required scanning space
by almost 70% [ZTG05].
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In addition to spreading quicker and being able to target a specific region or range
of IP addresses for attack, there are two other challenges that make the worms
problematic for the Internet community. First, the BGP and “/8” routing worm can cause
even more congestion than Slammer because the IP addresses generated by the routing
worms are inherently BGP routable. Unlike the other traditional scanning worms
including Slammer which use TCP/UDP that can be easily dropped if the generated
address is invalid, the addresses generated by a BGP worm are always valid at the BGP
router and therefore forwarded. Since Slammer and other worms scan the entire IPv4
address space 70% of their IP addresses generated are non-routable and dropped
[ZTG05]. Therefore, a majority of the traffic generated by Slammer, did not even appear
on the Internet backbone and did not cause any congestion. Despite this fact, Slammer
caused severe congestion to several local area networks and the Internet as a whole.
The second challenge presented by the BGP and “/8” routing worms is they are
more difficult to detect compared to previously observed scanning worms (e.g. Code
Red, Slammer, Witty). One of the major identifiers used to track scanning worms is the
large amount of traffic generated without response. Because the BGP and “/8” routing
worms generate packets that will be dropped by the routers and furthermore since the
failed responses would be delayed due to the routability of the infection packets,
detecting the worm based on an illegal traffic method would be slow [ZTG05].
2.2.5 The BGP Routing Worm Propagation

The BGP and “/8” routing worms were based on a mathematical model that
reflects the actual propagation parametrics observed in previous worms. The infection
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rate of the BGP and /8 routing worms were modeled using a uniform-scan worm model
described as [ZTG05]

dI t h
= I t (N - I t )
dt W

(1)

where It is the number of hosts infected at time t, N is the number of vulnerable systems,
η is the scanning rate, and W is the address space requiring scanning. Using Code Red as
a basis, the BGP and /8 routing worm infect rates versus the observed Code Red rates are
shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Zou Code Red Worm Simulation
The values used for the comparison were η = 358 scans per minute, N = 360,000,
and It = 10 systems infected. The address space to scan, W, was set to 4,294,967,296 for
the Code Red infection curve and 1.95 billion for the 116 Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) “/8” BGP routable addresses for the “/8” routing worm. The BGP
routing worm had all of the same variables except for the available address space. For
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the BGP routing worm W was set to 1,228,360,647 to reflect the further refinement of the
scanned address space. The outcome of this experiment showed that both the BGP and /8
worms operated significantly faster; more than 3 times as fast as the Code Red worm
[ZTG05]. Unlike the Zou Slammer-based worms (discussed below), there were no
changes in the scan rate made in the Zou Code Red-based Worms due to the the increase
of code size required to make the routing worms [ZTG05].
The model of Slammer as a “/8” routing worm was developed using the uniformscan worm model with η = 4000 scans per minute, N = 100,000, and It = 10 systems
infected [ZTG05]. The address space to scan, W, was set to 1,946,156,941 addresses.
The Slammer “/8” routing worm, referred to as the “routing Slammer worm,” used the
same values for N and It . However, to reflect the reduced address space of a “/8“ routing
worm and the increased code size of 520 bytes to incorporate the “/8” routing worm code
into Slammer, W was set to 1.95 billion and η was set to 3108.
A complete list of the variables used by Zou is provided in Table 1. The data
revealed that the new “routing Slammer worm” (hereafter called the Zou Slammer
routing worm) was more than twice as fast as the original Slammer infection rate as
shown in Figure 3 [ZTG05].
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Figure 3. Zou Slammer Worm Simulation
Table 1. Zou Worm Simulation Variables
Number of IP
addresses
Code Red Worm

Number of
Vulnerable
Systems

4,294,967,296

360,000

1,946,156,941

360,000

1,228,360,647

360,000

Zou Slammer Worm

4,294,967,296

100,000

Zou Slammer
Routing Worm

1,946,156,941

100,000

Zou Code Red "/8"
Routing Worm
Zou Code Red BGP
Worm

Packet
Generation
Speed
358 per
Minute
358 per
Minute
358 per
Minute
4,000 per
Second
3,108 per
Second

Initial Number of
Infected Systems
Ten
Ten
Ten
Ten
Ten

2.3 Internet Modeling
Due to the Internet’s complexity, rapid growth, and constant change, any attempt
at modeling it will be severely limited. Mathematical models, software simulations, and
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hardware simulations all suffer from a lack of size or ability to effectively mimic the
operation of the Internet. The biggest problem any model of the Internet is its inability to
model the true vastness of the global Internet community [FlP01]. There were an
estimated 16 million users in December of 1995 [Gro03], [IWS07]. The number of users
has increased to 1,093 million by December of 2006 [IWS07]. Even the most advanced
computer simulation software falls far short of being able to represent that many nodes on
a network.
Another problem with simulating the Internet is heterogeneity. The Internet,
while dominated by Microsoft products, is not a network of similar computers. There are
differences in platforms, link sizes, data rates, and network topologies that increase the
difficulty in accurately simulating the Internet even further. Also confusing the issue are
the differences in protocols used by these varied systems and networks. Each of these
protocols has their own operating characteristics, formats, and traffic loads to consider to
generate an accurate model [FlP01].
A third area of concern is the difficulty in representing the amount of traffic load.
The Internet has congestion control techniques and dynamic routing capability.
Simulating this adds significant complexity to a model. Further, Internet traffic is not
constant. The high traffic pattern for each network follow the same pattern as an average
workday; the traffic tends to increase as the workday begins, tails off over the lunch
period, starts to climb again after lunch until the end of the workday, and finally exhibits
some increase in the evening hours after dinner that has been attributed to
home/recreational computer use [FlP01]. Figure 4, shows a typical traffic pattern of
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several states in the United States that exhibit this pattern for a rise as the workday begins
and a falloff of traffic as nightfall occurs [Whe02].
Weekday Traffic Patterns
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8.0%
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6.0%
5.0%
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6
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Figure 4. Pattern of Daily Network Traffic
The final factor presented by Floyd and Paxson is that a model of the Internet will
likely not be useful tomorrow. The Internet changes everyday in its operation, size, and
use. Some of the areas that make the future Internet difficult to predict are pricing
structures, the explosive growth of wireless, and the currently undeveloped new “killer
application” [FlP01].
2.4 Internet Protocol Addressing
IPv4 is the predominant protocol used for Internet communication today, but on
the horizon is the IPv6. IPv4 has an address space of 232 yielding 4,294,967,296 IP
addresses. However, due to the reserved IP ranges and limitations on the range usable by
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Internet community, there are just over 3.5 billion useable IP addresses [WaC02]. Sixtyfive percent of the IPv4 address space is assigned to the United States and the growth of
the Internet in Europe and Asia is causing problems with a lack of available address
space [Huf03].
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) assigns and manages the available
Internet address for the world. From the IANA the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs)
receive large groups of IP addresses. These RIRs manage their assigned smaller
addresses and distribute an even smaller range to the large Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) for their area of responsibility. In turn, the large ISPs provide Internet connection
service to the smaller local ISPs and end users.
Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) is a prefix based standard for the
interpretation of IP address groupings to allow easier use and discussion. The slash
number designation, such as “/8,” denotes the prefix aggregation of the IP address from
the full 32 bit IPv4 address. Thus, a “/8” takes the 32 bit IPv4 address from
approximately 4.3 billion possible addresses and reduces the address to the last 24 bits as
the first 8 bits are masked. This reduces the IPv4 address space under consideration to
16,777,216. This “/8” grouping is the typical CIDR size provided to the RIRs for
dispersal to the ISPs.
The “/8” routing worm reduces the overall IPv4 address space by instituting a
CIDR “/8” allocation table as part of its functionality [ZTG05]. Therefore, out of the
possible 256 “/8” address groups, only 116 are IANA IP routable addresses. Based on
these restrictions and reserved addresses dedicated under the authority of IANA, the
scanning required by a “/8” routing worm is reduced to 45.3% of the IPv4 address space
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[ZTG05]. This means that instead of scanning the entire 4.3 billion IPv4 address space as
Slammer did, a CIDR “/8” based routing worm would only have to scan 1.95 billion
addresses.
2.5 Increasing Speed of Technology
The speed of both the Internet and computers is increasing each year. According
to the often-quoted Moore’s Law, the speed of computer processing power roughly
doubles every 18 months. Thus, if one uses Moore’s Law to compute the difference in a
computer attached to the Internet between 2003 and 2006, the system in 2006 should be
about 4 times faster. Moore’s Law has been used to predict everything from disk storage
capacity to digital camera resolution. Others have estimated the increase of network
capacity used Moore’s Law.
In fact, the growth of the Internet has more than matched the estimates of Moore’s
Law. During 1996-2002, the traffic on the Internet backbones in the United States
doubled every year and the infrastructure kept pace with this exponential growth [Odl03].
As previously mentioned, the number of users increased 68 times in just eleven years
from 16 million in 1995 to 1,093 million in 2006. This does not follow the Moore’s Law
rate of expansion.
2.6 Related Research
The primary focus of this research is to analyze the performance of the original
Slammer worm, the Slammer routing wom as proposed by Zou, and the SSE routing
proposed in this research on an IPv4 network [ZTG05]. The Slammer worm has been
used in many worm studies where a mathematical model was developed to simulate its
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effects [WMS05] [PeS04] [YuW04]. The BGP and “/8” routing worms are worms
proposed by Zou and modeled mathematically to compare against the observations of
Slammer and Code Red [ZTG05].
The Directed-Graph Epidemiological (DGE) model has been the basis for many
worm models [KeW91]. It extended the standard epidemiological model to a directedgraph model and uses in the analysis and simulation of viruses. DGE applied the simple
SIS (Susceptible -> Infected -> Susceptible) epidemiological model to various graphs to
emulate the propagation of viruses [KeW91]. This was one of the first attempts at
mathematically adapting virus propagation to the epidemiological model [KeW91] and
became a reference for future mathematical malicious logic modeling [CGK03] [KRD04]
[RSL04] [YuW04].
Chen used a mathematical model of Code Red to study the propagation
characteristics of worms [CGK03]. It was claimed that the model of Code Red closely
matched the infection rate curve data collected from the original Internet introduction of
Code Red, however no statistical basis for the claim was provided. The model provided a
formula for detecting, monitoring, and defending against further worm attacks and
provided a way to understand worms and aid in the defense against them in the future
[CGK03].
Permulla and Sundaragopalan extended worm modeling to the packet- level.
Their research developed a high- fidelity packet-level network simulation that emulated
the operation of worms on the Internet and included some real operational subsystems.
They included experiments with simulated live monitoring and defensive systems.
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However, the monitoring and defense system was not included in the mathematical
model of worm propagation [PeS04].
Wei Yu considered four classes of worms and characterized their operation
through modeling and numerical analysis. Yu analyzed pure random-based, peer-to-peer
hit list-based, cooperation-based, and non-cooperation based strategies for worm
operation. The numerical analysis found the most effective worms used hit lists
[YuW04]. This is similar to Zou when considering the “/8” routing worm as a form of
“hit list” worm [ZTG05]. An epidemic model simulated the actions of worms on the
Internet [YuW04].
The goal of the research performed by Joshua Hansen was to prove that a worm
could be programmed to find exploits on a heterogeneous network and use those exploits
to propagate without interaction with its creator. Hansen defines a heterogeneous
network environment as a network that has different operating systems; however, these
systems have a common software program that could be exploited [Han03]. This is
consistent with current Internet topology since, in 2004 Microsoft had the clear majority
of operating systems on the Internet [Fes04]. Java was chosen as the basis for the Hansen
exploit because of the wide use of Java across many operating systems including
Microsoft and UNIX. A six- node network using IPv4 with three real and three simulated
nodes using a virtual machine was used for this simulation. Of those nodes, the
experiment included one real and one virtual node, which communicated wirelessly.
Hansen did not use a live worm, but hard coded the exploit parameters into the modeling
code and initially programmed an artificial vulnerability into each node [Han03].
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Wei used Slammer data to validate a packet- level worm simulation on the Emulab
test bed using a realistic background traffic model [WMS05]. Their initial research used
the original Slammer data [MPW03], which consisted of 75,000 vulnerable systems and
an average scan rate of 4,000 packets per second and mathematical models of worm
propagation. The worm propagation models were built using the variables of
vulnerability ratio, scanning rate, infection delay, and scanning strategy. The scanning
strategy took into account how much of the address space the worm scanned and how the
worm performed the scan. It also modeled network congestion and network failures.
The resulting infection rate curves, shown in Figure 5, include an estimate of how quickly
a set of vulnerable system would be infected without network congestion [WMS05].

Figure 5. Wei Slammer Worm Simulation
Figure 6 shows Slammer worm propagation with the constant and random
background traffic values. Wei observed that there was a negligible difference between
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the infect rate of Slammer in the exponential and constant background traffic experiments
and attributed this to Slammer using UDP packets that could easily overcome the model
of the background traffic and congestion. A worm based on TCP would likely exhibit a
larger sensitivity to the background traffic values [WMS05].

Figure 6. Wei Slammer Worm propagation with Network Congestion
Wagner also used Slammer to validate models of network and bandwidth latency
constraints. The simulator was based on observed speed and connection data gathered
from the peer-to-peer file sharing software Napster and Gnutella hosts.

During the

Slammer portion of their research, Wagner created a 10-group network, set the initial
number of infected systems at 100, and the vulnerable systems at 75,000 [WPD03]. The
initial number of infected hosts appears to be arbitrarily assigned. The research found the
collected data matched the infection doubling rate observed during the original release of
the Slammer worm and the overall scanning rate after three minutes [MPW03], but
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deviated significantly from the observed propagation speed. This deviation was attributed
to an increase in line speeds since Slammer was originally released [WMS05].
2.7 Summary
This chapter provides an overview of related research. Specifically, the operation
of malicious logic with an emphasis on worms is provided. More detailed coverage of
the Code Red, Slammer and routing worms and their previously observed propagation
characteristics is also provided. Each of the worms is a version of a scanning worm that
is programmed to randomly scan the available address space.
There have been many mathematical simulations and models of both Slammer
and other scanning worms on IPv4 networks. Only Perumalla, Sundaragopalan and
Hansen tried to include actual operational systems into their research; however they did
not use the actual worms [PeS04] [Han03]. Wei performed some detailed simulation of
worm propagation using mathematical models and a network of computers [WMS05].
Zou proposed and mathematically evaluated a pair of routing worms that proved to be
faster than both the Code Red worm and the Slammer worm [ZTG05]. None of the
previous research has involved re-releasing the Slammer worm onto an actual network to
observe its effects for analysis. Rather, they relied on matching the previously observed
data to build and validate their models.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology used to create the experiment, the trials to
test the hypotheses, and the data analysis. Specifically, Section 3.2 present the problem
definition including the goals and hypotheses, the approach and the experimental
assumptions and limitations. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 cover the system boundaries and
system services. The workload, consisting of the various worms tested in this research, is
discussed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 covers the metrics collected. The parameters and
factors for this experiment are in Sections 3.7 and 3.8. The techniques used for
evaluating the data collected in this research are covered in Section 3.9. The network
configuration and the design of each worm tested is defined in Section 3.10. Finally,
Section 3.11 presents the analysis and interpretation of the results.
3.2 Problem Definition
3.2.1 Goals and Hypothesis

The primary goal of this research is to characterize the ability of the original
Slammer worm, the Slammer based routing worm proposed by Zou, and a new Single
Slash Eight (SSE) routing worm proposed by this research to infect vulnerable systems
within a given address space on an IPv4 network. The infection rate of these routing
worms across an IPv4 network are determined and their operation compared to the
original Slammer worm. This research also investigates the Slammer worm’s ability to
generate a uniform random IP addresses in a given address space. Finally, the
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implications of the speed increase of computing systems available today versus those in
use during the original Slammer release is discussed.
Since the Slammer routing worm has only been studied through mathematical
models [ZTG05], this research uses observed Slammer characteristics to mimic the
expected operation of a Slammer routing worm by analyzing its ability to generate
random IP addresses. To evaluate the randomness of the Slammer IP address operation,
each IP address generated will be evaluated as a whole and individually by octet. The
propagation speed of original Slammer worm, the Slammer routing worm, and the SSE
routing worms are compared assuming a computing system from 2003 and a system in
2007. This is accomplished using data collected from a modern infected system for the
2007 data and the use of the original Slammer characteristics for the 2003 data. The
experiment determines whether there is any significant difference between the
propagation speeds in 2003 versus 2007.
3.2.2 Approach

The original Slammer worm code is sent to a vulnerable system, also called the
victim, by a carrier workstation. Once the infection packet is received at the victim, the
worm code executes and the worm generates packets autonomously for further infections.
These infection packets generated by the victim are collected and used to characterize the
operation of the Slammer worm for simulation. These measured propagation
characteristics are combined with mathematical simulations and compared to the known
statistics of the Slammer worm in the wild.
The IP addresses of the Slammer infection packets are analyzed to determine the
worm’s ability to generate uniform random addresses. To ensure uniform distribution
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within the IP addresses, each of the last three octets is evaluated individually to determine
whether they are each uniformly random in distribution within their smaller address
space. Because the first octet is being simulated for the various routing worms, it can be
represented by any valid octet value and is not germane to this experiment.
Once the randomness has been determined, a mathematical simulation of
infection rate is generated using the variables required for original Slammer, the Slammer
routing worm, and the SSE routing worm. Within the mathematical simulation, the size
of the IP addresses available for scanning, the initial number of infected systems, and the
number of vulnerable systems are controlled and modified based on the particular worm
being evaluated.
Finally, the propagation characteristics collected from the Slammer infected
system are evaluated for their generation speed. This data is compared to the original
Slammer characteristics for the 2003 computing systems versus the current computing
systems available in 2007.
3.2.3 Assumptions and Limitations

It is assumed that a future exploits allowing the propagation of a worm like
Slammer will continue to occur. The primary limitation of this experiment is the inability
to accurately represent the Internet architecture as mentioned in Chapter 2. Without the
ability to represent the Internet or a large network, the true propagation characteristics of
the worms is necessarily limited.
3.3 System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) is an IP network known as the Network Under Attack. As
shown in Figure 7, the number of network nodes, protocol, topology, and links between
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nodes are all components of the Network Under Attack. The specific Component Under
Test (CUT) is the Slammer worm, Slammer routing worm, and SSE routing worm.

Figure 7. Network Under Attack
3.4 System Services
The service provided by this system is the transport of user data between nodes.
The outcome of this service is success, failure, or degraded operation due to worm
infection. Failure could be due to worm infection preventing valid user data from
crossing the network.
An illegitimate but interesting use of the system service is the propagation of
worms. The outcome of this service is also success, failure, or degradation. Success is
defined as the transfer of a worm from one node to another. Failure occurs when a worm
cannot move from one node to another. Degradation could be caused by the reduction of
the worm’s capability to spread due to the large traffic load.
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3.5 Workload
The workload of the system is the worms. The first worm, Slammer, provides a
basis for validation on the IPv4 network. The Slammer routing worm is compared to the
results generated by Slammer to determine whether it is faster and to [ZTG05] for
validation. Lastly, the SSE routing worm is compared against both Slammer and the
Slammer routing worm to determine how much faster it is.
3.6 Performance Metrics
The primary metric used in this experiment is the number of systems infected per
second. From the Matlab model of infection rate, the infection doubling rate can be
calculated. This rate is compared to the observed data validate the statistical model. The
known infection rate of Slammer on the Internet also provides a method to determine
whether the Slammer routing worm and SSE routing worm spread faster than Slammer.
The scanning rate is measured by the packets generated per second by an infected system
for a given time period. This metric is also used to compare scan rates between the
systems available for infection during the original Slammer release and those in use
today.
3.7 Parameters
3.7.1 System Parameters

-

Number of Nodes: The number of nodes in this experiment is limited by a
constant generation of a multicast address in the first octet that could not
be resolved during this research effort. Therefore, only one vulnerable
node is available for use in the analysis of each worm.
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-

Link Data Rate: As the congestion on a link increases due to network
traffic, the data rate of that link and how much traffic it can carry impacts
the spread of the worms. The link data rate varies from link to link and
cannot be adequately simulated in this research with the resources
available. Therefore, the variation in link capability is not a variable for
consideration in this experiment and each link is a direct connection
through a switch using Category 5e ethernet cable.

-

Operating System: Worms normally target one particular operating
system. If the nodes of the network are not running the target operating
system, the worm will not spread. Consideration of how non- vulnerable
nodes affect propagation is not considered. The target host is always
loaded with the vulnerable software component of Microsoft Server 2000,
which the Slammer worm exploits.

-

IP Version: IPv4 is used throughout this research. This facilitates the
baseline comparison of the worms under test against the known
propagation characteristics of Slammer.

-

Year of the Computing System: There are two time frames considered in
this experiment; the year Slammer was originally released (2003) and year
that this experiment takes place (2007). These two time frames provide a
comparison of the difference in speed of worms released onto systems
used in 2003 to those in use today. The use of the average Slammer worm
scan rate observed in 2003 and the operation of the Slammer worm on a
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computing system available today provides the baseline for this
comparison.
3.7.2 Workload Parameters

-

Worms: The worms represent a malicious packet workload for the
network to transport. Each worm, the original Slammer, the Slammer
routing worm, and the SSE routing worm, are all workload parameters in
this experiment.

3.8 Factors
The factors is the workload and the year of the computing system. There are three
main worms considered in this experiment – the original Slammer worm, the Slammer
routing worm, and the SSE routing worm. The original Slammer worm is used as a
baseline for comparison and validation of the other worms and mathematical simulation
using the archived data and experimental data from other experiments. How the
capabilities of the Slammer routing worm and the SSE routing worms compare to the
original Slammer worm is the focus of this experiment.
The second set of factors is the difference in packet generation rate between the
years 2003 and 2007. The average Slammer worm packet generation rate from 2003 is
used to establish the baseline for comparison to the data observed on a computing system
of today. To evaluate how a fast the Slammer worm, the Slammer routing worm and the
SSE routing worm could propagate on a computing system of today, the actual
observations of the scan rate of the Slammer code on the test network is used.
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3.9 Evaluation Technique
This experiment directly measures the generation of infection packets on a
network. This data and the originally observed Slammer scan rate is provided as the
input variable of the packets generated per second to a mathematical model to provide
infection rate data.
Two laptops connected by a switch, both described in Appendix A, are used to
simulate an attacking system and a vulnerable host. The attacking system sends the
infectious worm packet to the vulnerable host via UDP packet to infect that system.
Once the vulnerable host receives the infection packet, that host becomes infected and
begins to autonomously propagate the worm to randomly generated IP addresses.
The validation of the worm operation and infection rate is accomplished by
comparing previously collected Slammer data and experiments from [MPS03],
[WMS05], and [ZTG05]. The randomness of the IP addresses is validated through the
use of regression analysis and comparison to a statistically generated uniform distribution
of the available address space.
3.10 Experimental Design
3.10.1 Network Configuration and System Infection Procedure

The network configuration of the hardware for each run of the experiment uses
the same components. Each run consists of two laptops connected to a switch as shown
in Figure 8 connected by category 5e ethernet cable. The specifications for each
component are provided in Appendix A.
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Figure 8. Network Configuration
A detailed description of the Slammer code used for infecting the victim machine
is provided in Appendix B with analysis of the assembly code and a diagram of stack
operation. The Slammer worm code is sent via a UDP packet to the victim machine
using the Netcat tool. Netcat wraps the Slammer binary code in a UDP packet and sends
the completed packet to the destination address and port specified. This is accomplished
by invoking the Netcat software through the use of the command line as shown in Figure
9.

Figure 9. Netcat Infection Command
Each new infection is initiated using this same command line interface. The
breakdown of the command is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Netcat Infection Command Description
nc
Calls Netcat
Program

-w2
129.249.92.11
-u -1434
< Slammer
Wait two seconds
Open a UDP
Send the
to close
Target IP Address connection to port "Slammer" file to
connection
1434
the Target

3.10.2 Experimental Exploration of Slammer Randomness

To establish a baseline for comparison, the Slammer packets are collected and
used to build a statistical graph of the infection rate for comparison to the real world
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observed operation of Slammer. The first step in this process is to establish that the IP
addresses generated by Slammer are statistically random. The problem with the random
number generator in Slammer is well documented in [MPS03] and [MPW03]. This flaw
affects the first octet and is therefore not part of the experimental consideration in the
generation of random IP addresses. Only the last three octets are analyzed and used for
the examination of randomness.
The uniform distribution of the random addresses generated by Slammer is
verified by analyzing the infection packets generated by Slammer as an entire IP address
space of three octets and individually as to the randomness of the octets themselves. To
verify the statistical uniformity of the random numbers generated by Slammer, the total
address space under consideration is divided into an evenly distributed groupings based
on the number of samples taken. The grouping is established by first taking the upper
value range minus one to account for the value of zero to establish the upper range of the
data set under evaluation. This upper range is then divided by the number of samples
taken which provides the statistical interval for each sample point. The statistical interval
is then multiplied by the sample event number to generated the statistical average for that
sample point. The sample event number and the statistical average are plotted on an
“XY” scatter plot to generate a regression line for analysis of the data collected.
For example, if the experiment called for a statistical spread of a single
hexadecimal number with 20 samples the calculations would be as shown in Table 3. To
find the upper limit, the total possible values of single hexadecimal number, 16, is
reduced by one to account for the value of zero. This upper limit of 15 is divided by the
number of samples taken of 20, which calculates the statistical interval of 0.75. The
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statistical interval of 0.75 is then multiplied by each sample event number including zero
to generate the statistical average for the data set.
Table 3. Statistical Model Example
Samples
Taken
Statistical
Interval
Event No.
Statistical
Average
Event No.
Statistical
Average

20
0.75
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0
11

0.75
12

1.5
13

2.25
14

3
15

3.75
16

4.5
17

5.25
18

6
19

6.75
20

7.5

8.25

9

9.75

13.5 14.25

15

10.5 11.25

12 12.75

This data is then input into an “XY” scatter plot to show the relationship between
the samples collected and values expected as shown in Figure 10. The linearity of the
data collected is compared to the statistical model to establish whether the data exhibits a
similar linearity.

Statistical Average
Hexadecimal Value

15

10
5

0
0

5

10

15

Samples Taken

Figure 10. Statistical Model Graph Example
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The statistical similarity of the model to the data collected will prove whether the
data collected is uniformly distributed and therefore statistically random across the
available address space. Table 4 provides sample points of the statistical model used for
the single octet and combined octet experiments.
Table 4. Experiment Statistical Model
Address
Space
Single
Octets
Three
Octets

Range of Samples
Samples Taken
256

Statistical
Interval

Example Event Value
16

128

65535

0.00389105

0.062 0.498

16777216 65535

256.003891

4096

192

1024

4096

16384

0.747

3.9844 15.9377 63.751

65535
255

32768 49153 262148 1048592 4194368 16777215

3.10.3 Matlab Model of Infection Rate

The Matlab model used in this research produces a worm infection rate based on
several variables. An overview of the operation of the Matlab model code is provided
here and in more detail in Appendix C. The number of initially infected systems, the
number of vulnerable systems and the number of possible addresses available for
scanning are all entered into the model. The number of vulnerable systems is a range that
always starts at 1 and ends at the total number of vulnerable systems. The Matlab model
uses a pseudo random number generator to generate a number that represents an infection
packet for an IP address of a system for each iteration of the code. The Matlab model
generates one of these numbers for each system infected prior to that iteration. These IP
address numbers are compared against the total number of remaining vulnerable systems.
If the IP address numbers fall within the range of the vulnerable systems then the
iteration number is documented and the available vulnerable systems is reduced by one.
If the IP address is not within the range of the vulnerable systems then the Matlab model
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continues to the next iteration. This continues until the vulnerable systems are reduced to
zero, which indicates that all of the vulnerable systems have been infected. The Matlab
model then generates the file containing the iteration numbers of when each system was
infected, those numbers are entered into an Excel spreadsheet and multiplied by the
packet per second rate the worm generates.
For example, if the total number of vulnerable systems is 10, the number of
possible addresses is 100, and the initially infected systems equals 1, then the Matlab
code would generate one random number for the first iteration. If the random number
generated falls within the range of 1-10 then the iteration number is noted by the code
and the number of vulnerable systems is reduced to 9. On the next iteration, the Matlab
code generates one random number for each of the two infected systems and compares
those numbers to the remaining vulnerable systems. An example of 5 iterations of the
Matlab model code, including the first two iterations detailed above, are demonstrated in
Table 5 for a worm packet per second rate of 1 second.
Table 5. Matlab Model Infection Rate Example

Iteration
1
2
3
4
5

Number of
Infected
Systems

Number of
Vulnerable
Systems
1
2
2
3
3

10
9
9
8
8

Number of Number of Pseudo
Numbers
Addresses Random Number
Generated
Available
Generated
100
100
100
100
100

1
7
2 83 & 59
2
3 & 60
3 12, 33, 72
3 45, 51, 90

Time of
Infection
in
Seconds
1
2
4
-

From this information a graph of the infection rate curve can be generated as
shown in Figure 11 where the data in Table 5 is extended exponentially.
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Matlab Model Infection Rate Example
10

Systems Infected

8

6

4

2

0
0

100

200
300
Time in Seconds

400

500

Figure 11. Matlab Model Infection Rate Example
3.10.4 Experimental Validation of Matlab Model Infection Rate Simulation

Once the uniform distribution of the random packets generated by a Slammerinfected system is verified, the Matlab model of worm infection rates is validated. The
verification of the mathematically generated infection rate is accomplished by comparing
the curve generated by the Matlab model code (Section 3.10.3 and Appendix C) against
the curves generated by previous research and the original observations of the Slammer
worm from 2003. The Matlab model is first compared against the Code Red worm, the
Code Red “/8” routing worm, and the Code Red BGP routing worm experiments
[ZTG05]. A more detailed comparison is performed against the Slammer worm’s
original infection rate and the results found in the research of the Slammer worm
completed by Wei and Zou [WMS05] [ZTG05]. Finally, the proposed SSE routing worm
is compared against the Matlab models of the Slammer worms of 2003/2007 and the
Slammer routing worms of 2003/2007.
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As discussed in Section 3.10.3, the Matlab model generates an infection rate
curve based on the variables of the initially infected systems, the number of vulnerable
systems, and the size of the address space being scanned by the worm. The Matlab
model variables used to generate the infection rate curves for each of the worms tested in
this research are described below and in Appendix C.
3.10.4.1 Matlab Model Variables for the Code Red Worm Comparisons

The Code Red worm simulations have a vulnerable population of 360,000 and an
initial number of infected systems of 10. The scan rate for the Code Red test is based on
the observed rate of 358 scans per minute. These values and the 4.3 billion possible
addresses are provided to the Matlab model simulation as the input variables. For ease of
reference, Table 6 provides all of the variables used in the Matlab model for the three
Code Red simulations.
The Zou Code Red “/8” routing worm simulations consist of a vulnerable
population of 360,000 and an initial number of infected systems of 10. The scan rate for
the Zou Code Red “/8” routing worm test remains at the observed Code Red rate of 358
scans per minute. However, to mimic the operation of the “/8” routing worm’s ability to
reduce the address space required to scan the possible addresses are reduced to
1,946,156,941.
The Zou Code Red BGP routing worm simulations have of a vulnerable
population of 360,000 and an initial number of infected systems of 10. The scan rate for
the Zou Code Red BGP routing worm test remains at the observed Code Red rate of 358
scans per minute. However, because the Zou Code Red BGP routing worm further
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refines the address space required for scanning the possible addresses are reduced to a
total of 1,228,360,647.
Table 6. Matlab Model Variables for Code Red Worms

Number of IP
addresses
Code Red
Worm
Zou Code Red
"/8" Routing
Worm
Zou Code Red
BGP Worm

Number of
Vulnerable
Systems

Number of
Iterations

Number
of Trials

Initial
Number of
Infected
Systems

4,294,967,296

360,000 10,000,000

1

Ten

1,946,156,941

360,000

500,000

1

Ten

1,228,360,647

360,000

500,000

1

Ten

Due to the number of vulnerable systems, and the results of the trial tests, this
experiment is run only once as an evaluation of the Matlab model infection rate. The
remaining worm tests are examined more thoroughly to establish the validity of the
Matlab model.
3.10.4.2 Matlab Model Variables for the Zou Slammer Worm Comparisons

At the time of Slammers release in January of 2003 the vulnerable population was
estimated at 75,000 with 74,856 unique IP addresses observed [MPW03]. Unfortunately,
the numbers used by Zou was arbitrarily set to100,000 for the number of vulnerable
systems and 10 for number of initially infected systems [ZTG05]. The scan rate used for
the Zou Slammer worm is 4,000 packets per second, which simulates the observed
average of Slammer worm during its original run. Table 7 provides the Matlab model
variables used in the Zou Slammer worm simulations.
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Table 7. Matlab Model Variables for Zou Slammer Worms
Number of IP
addresses

Number of
Vulnerable
Systems

Number of Number
Iterations of Trials

Initial Number
of Infected
Systems

Zou Slammer Worm

4,294,967,296

100,000 10,000,000

20

Ten

Zou Slammer Routing
Worm

1,946,156,941

100,000

20

Ten

500,000

The Zou Slammer routing worm is run in the Matlab model with the same 10
initially infected systems as the Zou Slammer worm. However, the number of IP
addresses and scanning rate are changed to reflect the capabilities of the Zou Slammer
worm. The number of IP addresses available for scanning by the Zou Slammer routing
worm is reduced to 1,946,156,941 to reflect the worm’s ability to reduce the required
scanning space and the scan rate is decreased to 3,108 pps to reflect the larger packet size
of 520 bytes.
The Slammer worm simulations are run in the Matlab model 20 times and used to
generate a mean infection rate curve with confidence level of 95%.
3.10.4.3 Matlab Model Variables for the Slammer Worm Comparisons

To more accurately represent the actual operation of the original Slammer worm,
number of vulnerable systems is set to the 74,856 unique IP addresses observed in 2003
is used for the Slammer worm 2003 model. Additionally, the number of initially infected
systems is set to one since there was no evidence to support there was originally more
than one initially infected system. The scan rate used for the Slammer worm 2003 is set
at the originally observed 4,000 packets per second. Table 8 provides the Matlab model
variables used in the Slammer worm 2003 and 2007 simulations.
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The Slammer worm 2007 is run using the Matlab model with the same number of
initially infected systems and vulnerable systems as the Slammer worm 2003. However,
the scanning rate is changed to 14,398 pps to reflect the observed capabilities of
computing systems today.
The Slammer worm simulations are run in the Matlab model 20 times and used to
generate a mean infection rate curve with confidence level of 95%.
Table 8. Matlab Model Variables for the Slammer Worms
Number of
Initial Number
Number of Number
Vulnerable
of Infected
Iterations of Trials
Systems
Systems
4,294,967,296
74,856 10,000,000
20
One
4,294,967,296
74,856 10,000,000
20
One
Number of IP
addresses

Slammer Worm 2003
Slammer Worm 2007

3.10.4.3 Matlab Model Variables for the Slammer Routing Worm Comparisons

Due to the use of an arbitrary number of 100,000 vulnerable systems and 10
initially infected systems by Zou, the infection rate curve they generated does not
accurately represent how a Slammer routing worm would have behaved in 2003. To
correct this problem, the Matlab model is used to generate a Slammer routing worm using
the original 2003 Slammer worm numbers. Thus, the number of vulnerable systems is set
to the 74,856 unique IP addresses and the number of initially infected systems is set at
one. The scan rate used for the Slammer routing worm 2003 is set at the originally
observed 3,108 packets per second as calculated by Zou because of the increase of the
infection packet size to 520 bytes [ZTG05]. Table 9 provides the Matlab model variables
used in the Slammer routing worm 2003 and 2007 simulations.
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The Slammer routing worm 2007 is run using the Matlab model with the same
number of initially infected systems and vulnerable systems as the Slammer routing
worm 2003. However, the scanning rate is changed to 11,187 pps to reflect the increased
packet generation capabilities of computing systems today.
The Slammer routing worm simulations are run in the Matlab model 20 times and
used to generate a mean infection rate curve with confidence level of 95%.
Table 9. Matlab Model Variables for the Slammer Routing Worms
Number of IP
addresses
Slammer Routing
Worm 2003
Slammer Routing
Worm 2007

Number of
Initial Number
Number of Number
Vulnerable
of Infected
Iterations of Trials
Systems
Systems

1,946,156,941

74,856

500,000

20

One

1,946,156,941

74,856

500,000

20

One

3.10.4.4 Matlab Model Variables for the SSE Routing Worm Comparisons

For the analysis of the SSE routing worms proposed in this research, the number
of vulnerable systems is reduced to the size of one “/8” grouping of IP addresses. The
total 74,856 vulnerable systems are divided by the 116 “/8” routable addresses. This
makes the total vulnerable population within each “/8” set scanned by the SSE routing
worm 645 systems. The number of IP addresses scanned by the SSE routing worm is also
reduced to 16.7 million. This represents the total of the 1.95 billion available for normal
Slammer routing worm divided into the 116 “/8” ranges. Due to the size of the SSE
routing worm only increasing the original Slammer worm code by eight bytes, the
packets per second rate is set at 3,922. Table 10 provides the Matlab model variables
used in the SSE routing worm 2003 and 2007 simulations.
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The SSE routing worm 2007 is run in the Matlab model with the same number of
initially infected systems and vulnerable systems as the SSE routing worm 2003.
However, the scanning rate is changed to 14,118 pps to reflect the increased packet
generation capabilities of computing systems today.
The SSE routing worm simulation is run in the Matlab model 50 times using the
previously identified 16.7 million addresses and 645 vulnerable systems. This curve is
compared to the previous worm simulations for analysis of similarity.
Table 10. Matlab Model Variables for the SSE Routing Worms
Number of IP
addresses
SSE Routing Worm
2003
SSE Routing Worm
2007

Number of
Initial Number
Number of Number
Vulnerable
of Infected
Iterations of Trials
Systems
Systems

16,777,216

645

500,000

50

One

16,777,216

645

500,000

50

One

3.10.5 Experimental Examination of the Slammer Scanning Rate

Packet generation rate by original Slammer worm is collected from the testbed
network to provide another point of comparison with the real world observations. The
packets are collected after the initial infection is complete and the infected system is
automatically generating infection packets. The mean difference in inter-arrival time
between each packet is measured for the collection period. Twenty separate collections
of infection packets are used to generate the packet per second rate.
From the packet generation analysis, the speed of an average 2007 computing
system is estimated and used to generate a comparison between the worm speeds of today
versus those possible in 2003. For these tests, the original Slammer worms, the Slammer
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routing worms, and the SSE routing worms are set to their respective available address
scanning spaces and vulnerable systems as shown in Table 11.
Table 11. Worm Variables for Year Simulations
Number of IP
addresses

Number of
Number of
Vulnerable
Iterations
Systems

Number
of Trials

Initial Number
of Infected
Systems

Slammer Worm
2003

4,294,967,296

74,856 10,000,000

20

One

Slammer Worm
2007

4,294,967,296

74,856 10,000,000

20

One

Slammer Routing
Worm 2003

1,946,156,941

74,856

500,000

20

One

Slammer Routing
Worm 2007

1,946,156,941

74,856

500,000

20

One

SSE Routing
Worm 2003

16,777,216

645

500,000

50

One

SSE Routing
Worm 2007

16,777,216

645

500,000

50

One

3.10.6 Examination of the Slammer Infection Doubling Rate

From the Matlab model simulations of the Slammer worm 2003 variable numbers
an infection doubling rate is developed for comparison to the 8.5 (+/-1) second estimated
by Moore [MPW03]. This estimated global infection doubling rate is calculated for
65,536 systems, which is the largest number of vulnerable systems attainable prior to the
limit of 74,856 possible systems. The Moore research noted, the original Slammer worm
doubling rate was only estimated for the first minute [MPW03]. Therefore, in addition to
the complete doubling rate curve, a more detailed analysis of the first 60 seconds is
provided. Then Matlab model of the Slammer worm 2003 doubling rate is compared
original Slammer worm infection doubling rate curve for evaluation of their similarity.
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3.11 Analysis and Interpretation of Results
There are many aspects of the Slammer worm investigated in this research, the
first of which is the packet per second generation speed. The packets generated per
second by the Slammer worm infected system on the testbed network are analyzed and
compared to the observed number of packets per second generated by Slammer in
January 2003. This provides a basis for the calculating the time for each potential victim
to be infected on the current Internet, which allows the speed of infection to be
determined that could be expected if the worms were released on a network today.
This research investigates the Slammer worm’s ability to generate a uniform
random IP addresses in a given address space through the use of statistical comparison.
Based on the comparison of the destination IP addresses of infection packets collected to
the statistically generated regression line the uniform distribution of the Slammer worm’s
IP address generation is established. The similarity between these is evaluated to
establish the uniformity of distribution. Further, to determine if the Slammer worm is
generating the random IP addresses in a non-random pattern, lag plots of the data are
created to analyze for existence of an observable pattern. The presence of a pattern
demonstrates the numbers are in fact correlated. The combination of the analysis of the
uniform distribution and lag plots provide this research to determine the statistical
randomness of the Slammer worm’s generation of IP addresses.
The Matlab model of worm infection rates is compared to previous research for
validation and analysis of the original Slammer worm, the Slammer routing worm, and
the SSE routing worm. The first Matlab Model comparison made is to the Code Red
worm research performed by Zou [ZTG05]. The Matlab model of the Code Red worm,
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the Zou Code Red BGP routing worm, and the Zou Code Red “/8” Routing is analyzed
for similarity to the of the Zou infection rates of those worms [ZTG05]. The Matlab
model of the original Slammer worm infection rate is compared to the observed Slammer
characteristics from January 2003 and to the results of the Wei and Zou research
[WMS05], [MPS03], [MPW03], and [ZTG05]. As part of this comparison of the Matlab
model to the Slammer worm’s operational characteristics, the Matlab model rate of
infected systems doubling versus that observed by Moore is performed [MPW03]. If the
comparisons show a close relationship, then the Matlab model simulations can be
considered representative of how the original Slammer worm operates.
The Matlab model is used to generate the infection rate curves for comparison of
the original Slammer worm 2003 and how the Slammer worm operates on a system of
today. The Slammer routing worm is also generated by the Matlab model for the 2003
and 2007 computing system operation. These four worms, the Slammer worm 2003/2007
and the Slammer routing worm 2003/2007, are compared to determine the speed
differences between each other. These differences will determine how fast each worm is
in relation to each other and characterizes their infection rate.
Finally, the SSE routing worm is modeled by Matlab to characterize its infection
rate. Then the SSE routing worm 2003/2007 are calculated and compared to the
Slammer worm 2003/2007 and Slammer routing worm 2003/2007 for determination of
the speed difference between them. These final comparisons provide the ability to
determine which of these worms is the fastest at infecting a vulnerable population.
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3.12 Summary
This chapter discusses the methods used to analyze the propagation of the original
Slammer worm, the Slammer Routing worm, and the SSE routing worm across an IPv4
network. This chapter defines under consideration for this research, the goals and
hypothesis, the approach taken to complete this experiment, and the assumptions and
limitations bounding this research. In this chapter, the system boundaries, the services
provided by the system, and the workload of the system is covered. The metrics used in
the measurement of performance, the description of the system and workload parameters,
and the factors are discussed in this chapter. The techniques used for evaluating the data
and a detailed explanation of the experiment design is provided. This chapter concludes
with coverage of the analysis and interpretation of the results generated by the
experiments in this research.
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IV. Analysis and Results
This chapter presents the results and analysis of the data collected from the
experiment simulations of the worm infections. Section 4.1 covers the collection and
analysis of Slammer’s packet per second generation. Section 4.2 examines the
randomness of Slammer’s IP address and octet generation. In Section 4.3 the Matlab
worm models are presented for comparison to the original Slammer worm and the routing
worm models proposed by Zou. The comparison of worm speeds possible on computing
systems of today versus those available in 2003 is provided in Section 4.4. Section 4.5
examines the infection rate of the original Slammer worm versus the SSE routing worm.
4.1 Slammer Packet Generation
The test run to identify a mean packet generation time by an infected system
yielded interesting results. Twenty separate collections of packets generated by the
original Slammer worm code are collected and analyzed. As shown in Table 12, the
mean time between packet generation is 69.46 µsec with the laptop operating on A/C
power. This generation time is extremely stable, as seen by the small standard deviation
and confidence intervals. This equates to 14,398 packets per second (pps), which falls
into the upper half of the range observed during the Slammer worm’s original release of
an average 4,000 and maximum 26,000 scans per second per worm- infected machine
[MPS03].
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Table 12. Slammer Packet Per Second on A/C Power
Average Inter-Arrival
Time of Infection
Packets

Standard
Deviation

Upper
Confidence
Interval @95%

Lower
Confidence
Interval @ 95%

69.46 µsec

1.49 µsec

70.11 µsec

68.8 µsec

Packets Per
Second or
Scans Per
Second
14398 pps

The testing of Slammer’s packet per second capability reveals an increase in the
time to generate packets when the system is operating on battery power. A short test and
analysis of this anomaly is performed to calculate the packets per second of Slammer on
battery power. As shown in Table 13, the infected system generates less than half of the
amount of packets on battery power as it does on A/C power. The mean time between
packet generation is 152.28 µsec with the laptop operating on battery power. The
standard deviation and confidence intervals are only slightly larger than those observed
while operating on A/C showing that the system is still fairly stable in the packet per
second generation while operating on battery power. This generation rate equates 6,567
pps on battery power. Although this is amount is less than half of the observed amount
when operating on A/C power, Slammer is still generating over the average 4,000 and
below the maximum 26,000 scans per second per worm- infected machine observed on
the Internet [MPS03].
Table 13. Slammer Packet Per Second on Battery Power
Average Inter-Arrival
Time of Infection
Packets

Standard
Deviation

Upper
Confidence
Interval @95%

Lower
Confidence
Interval @ 95%

152.28 µsec

6.01 µsec

155.55 µsec

149.02 µsec

Packets Per
Second or
Scans Per
Second
6,567 pps

This data confirms that the Slammer code being utilized is operating within the
previously observed characteristics and validates the use of the A/C power packets per
second for use in calculating the time it will take to infect a group of systems of similar
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construction. The validation of the Matlab model infection rates will initially be
validated using 4,000 scans per second per worm [ZTG05], [WMS05], [MPW03].
Moore’s Law has been refined and changed over the years. Adjustments had to
be made due to observations where Moore’s Law fell short by 38% during a 1970’s
estimate and was over by 27% in 1975 of transistor capabilities. The original version of
the law developed in 1965, was that the doubling would occur every 12 months. Later,
there was some consideration given to increase the time span to 24 months. This
refinement led to the currently quoted estimation of 18 months.
Due to this ever-changing growth rate, this 18- month rule has been refined further
to try and match the observed growth curves. Dave Epstein of the Microprocessor
Report suggested a solution to the variation in Moore’s Law called “Epstein’s
amendment.” Epstein’s amendment modifies the growth calculations of Moore’s Law by
adding an additional six months to the doubling rate on an every ten years interval.
Where in the 1970s the growth rate was every twelve months, by 1980 the doubling rate
needed to be increased to every 18 months. Finally, by Epstein’s amendment, the growth
rate in 2000 was projected to double every 30 months [Hal06].
In consideration of Moore’s Law and Epstein’s modification, the operational
characteristics of systems currently connected to the Internet should approach the average
Slammer packet per second generation of 3.2 times that originally observed in January of
2003. Thus, a network of computers in January 2007 should produce an average of
12,800 pps when infected by Slammer. The observed packet per second rate for a
Slammer infected system during this research is 14,398 pps. The observed packet per
second generation is 12.48% greater than that of the Moore’s Law with the Epstein
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modification estimate. However, the estimated 2007 upper limit of scan per second is
calculated at 83,200 using Moore’s Law with the Epstein amendment. This makes the
14,398 pps observed during this research fall within the estimated range from the average
of 12,800 to a maximum of 83,200 for a computing system of today. Thus, for final
speed analysis of a computing system in 2007 the average observed results for Slammer
packet generation on an A/C power source of 14,398 pps is used.
4.2 Slammer Randomness
The true randomness of the original Slammer worm’s pseudo random number
generator has previously been studied by Moore [MPS03]. In that analysis they observed
a small flaw that limited the ability of the original Slammer worm to generate random
numbers, the corrections of which are discussed in more detail in Appendix B [MPS03].
However, this flaw did not prevent Slammer from essentially taking over the Internet
during its run [HyE03]. In these next two subsections the analysis of Slammer’s
capability to uniformly generate random IP Addresses across the IP address range under
test is presented. First, Slammer’s ability to generate a uniform distribution of IP’s across
the entire address span under test is considered. Then Slammer’s ability to generate a
uniform random distribution across the individual last three IP address octets is
examined.
4.2.1 Slammer IP Address Randomness

The analysis provided here shows that despite its flaws, the original Slammer
worm generated IP addresses are well distributed throughout the address space.
However, as a whole there is a pattern in the form that the addresses are generated. This
could be indicative of the flaw noted by Moore [MPS03] [MPW03].
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The lag plot in Figure 12 of the IP addresses generated by the Slammer worm is a
typical example of 100,000 data points obtained during testing. This lag plot of the
combined octets generated by Slammer shows a pattern in the IP address generation. The
addresses that are generated seem to develop a repeating diamond pattern formed by two
faintly intersecting lines. From this lag plot it is clear that there is an observable pattern
to the generation of random numbers by Slammer. Despite this anomaly, the worm
provides a fairly uniform distribution for the statistical coverage of the entire range of IP
addresses being considered in this experiment.

Lag Plot of Combined Octets
16000000

Combined Octets

14000000
12000000
10000000
8000000
6000000
4000000
2000000
0
0

2000000

4000000

6000000

8000000

10000000

12000000

14000000

16000000

Combined Octets (i-1)

Figure 12. Lag Plot of Slammer-Generated IP Addresses
The regression equation of the Slammer IP addresses gathered from the infection
packets, as shown in Table 14, shows that the p-value for the comparison to the
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statistically generated IP address line is zero. This means there is a high correlation
between the statistical and Slammer- generated IP addresses. Further, the R-squared
values, which represent the closeness of fit to a linear line, are both 100% indicating that
the Slammer- generated packets match the statistical line
Table 14. Slammer IP Address Generation Regression Analysis
The regression equation is
Slammer Generated = -197.4
S = 1945.04
Analysis of Variance
Source
DF
Regression
1
Error
65533
Total
65534

+ 1.00 Statistically Generated
R-Sq = 100%
R-Sq(adj) = 100%
SS
MS
F
P
1.53721E+18 1.53721E+18 4.06328E+11 0.000
2.47923E+11 3.78318E+06
1.53721E+18

The residual plots, shown in Figure 13, further demonstrate the even distribution
of the Slammer-generated IP addresses. Although there is a large variation in the
calculated value of residuals, this can be explained by the size of the address space
compared to the number of samples. Because the address space under consideration is
4.3 billion possible addresses and the number of samples used in analysis limited by
software restrictions and memory limits, the residual analysis is based on 0.0015 percent
of the possible addresses available. This numerical limitation is causing the larger
variation in residuals shown. However, both visually and mathematically, the plots show
that the differences between the IP addresses generated by Slammer are uniform across
the range of the address space. The normal probability plot illustrates that the generated
packets match the statistical line with only a small deviation at the tails of less than one
percent. Both the fitted value and observation order of the residuals show that there is an
even distribution of differences across the IP address range. Finally, the histogram of the
56

residuals shows a well centered distribution with tails that fall away at a smooth rate.
The histogram strongly indicates the Slammer-generated IP addresses and the statistically
generated IP addresses are the same.
The fitted line plot in Figure 14 demonstrates both visually and mathematically
that the IP addresses generated by Slammer and the statistical model are identical. As
shown previously in the analysis of the residuals, this fitted line plot analysis calculates
the R-squared values to be a 100% match.
Residual Plots for Slammer Worm Versus Statistically Generated IP Addresses
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Figure 13. Residual Plots of Slammer IP Address Generation
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Fitted Line Plot for Slammer Generated IP Addresses vs. Statistical Model
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Figure 14. Fitted Line Plot of Slammer versus Statistical Model
Thus, despite the Slammer-generated IP address pattern observed in Figure 12,
the IP addresses generated are shown to be uniformly distributed across the IP range
being considered. This uniform distribution ensures the experiment will accurately
represent the simulation of a randomly scanning worm across the IP address space.
4.2.2 Slammer Octet Randomness

In this subsection each individual octet generated by Slammer is examined to
determine the uniformity of distribution throughout the octet range. This uniform
distribution demonstrates a statistical coverage, in that the entire range is of addresses is
chosen with equal probability, over the entire range of octets being considered in this
experiment. The detail provided in this section further validates the ability of a Slammerbased worm to randomly generate any octet value for a given IP range. Each octet is
individually examined to provide fine granularity for emphasis on the uniform
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distribution within the set of randomly generated octets. Each individual lag plot is a
typical example of a collection of 2,560 data points. This provides the clearest visual
indication of whether a trend in the data is present. However, the regression equations
and residual plots are attained through the use of the same typical 65,534 data point
captures.
4.2.2.1 Slammer Second Octet Randomness

Shown in Figure 15, the lag plot of the second octet demonstrates some of the
previously observed anomalies that were found during the evaluation of the combined
octet generation lag plot. Here the lines are harder to discern, but the lines are still
visually observable illustrating that there is some pattern to the generation of the octets.
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Figure 15. Lag Plot of Slammer-Generated Second Octet
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However, once again the regression equation of the Slammer generation of the
second octet, as shown in Table 15, shows a value of zero for the p-value for the
comparison to the statistically generated octet series. This means there is a high
correlation between the statistical and Slammer-generated random octet series. Further,
the R-squared values, which represent the closeness of fit to a linear line, are both 100%
indicating that the Slammer- generated packets match the statistical line.
Table 15. Slammer-Generated Second Octet Regression Analysis
The regression equation is
Slammer Generated = -0.5422 + 0.9998 Statistically Generated
S = 0.300637
R-Sq = 100%
R-Sq(adj) = 100%
Analysis of Variance
Source
DF
SS
MS
F
P
Regression
1
357748656
357748656
3.95816E+09 0.000
Error
65533
5923
0
Total
65534
357754579

The residual plots, shown in Figure 16, further demonstrate the even distribution
of the Slammer-generated IP addresses. The 4-way plot shows that the differences
between the octets generated by Slammer and the statistical model are uniform across the
range of the address space. The normal probability plot illustrates that the generated
packets match the statistical line with some small deviation at the tails of less than five
percent. Both the fitted value and observation order of the residuals show that there is an
even distribution of differences across the octet range, but visually there appears to be
some possible sinusoidal pattern to the octets generated. This sinusoidal modulation is
small with a +/- 0.25 difference in the residuals. The histogram of the residuals illustrates
a visually unusual pattern with the distribution of the histogram being normally
distributed with a flattened top. This flattened top is not due to graphical clipping, but
indicates that the differences in the residuals are evenly spread across the octet address
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span. Despite these unusual visual patterns, the statistical analysis of the regression
equation denotes the data is statistically uniformly distributed across the address space.
In the fitted line plot in Figure 17, it is shown that both visually and
mathematically that the second octet generated by Slammer and the statistical model are
identical. As shown previously in the analysis of the residual equation and plots, the
fitted line plot analysis shows the R-squared values to be a 100% match.
Residual Plots for Slammer Generated Second Octet
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Figure 16. Residual Plot for Slammer-Generated Second Octet
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Fitted Line Plot
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Figure 17. Fitted Line Plot for Slammer-Generated Second Octet
4.2.2.2 Slammer Third and Fourth Octet Randomness

The analysis for the third and fourth octets generated by Slammer reveals results
that are almost identical. Unlike the combined octet and second octet lag plots, the lag
plots for the third and fourth octets shown in Figures 18 and 19 do not exhibit any
discernable address generation pattern. This provides further evidence that the pattern
observed in the combined and second octet lag plot analyses are related and not
necessarily pervasive throughout the original Slammer worm random address generation
code. This also indicates that the diamond pattern observed is related to the errors
denoted in the Slammer worm analysis performed by Moore [MPS03]. Further detailed
analysis to pinpoint this anomaly in the random number generation algorithm anomaly is
not part of this research; however this may need to be investigated prior to extending the
experiment presented here.
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Another indication in the similarity between the third and fourth octets is the
extremely small difference in their regression equations as shown in Tables 16 and 17.
Due to this similarity, their analysis is combined for brevity. The regression equations
for the Slammer generation of these last two octets each have a zero for their p-value.
This proves there is a high correlation between the statistical and Slammer-generated
random octets. The R-squared values for each of the last two octets equal 100%. This
analysis shows, once again, that the random octets generated by Slammer match the
statistical line.
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Figure 18. Lag Plot of Slammer-Generated Third Octet
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Lag Plot Fourth Octet
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Figure 19. Lag Plot of Slammer-Generated Fourth Octet
Table 16. Slammer-Generated Third Octet Regression Analysis
The regression equation is
Slammer Generated = -0.5076 + 0.9996 Statistically Generated
S = 0.322242
R-Sq = 100%
R-Sq(adj) = 100%
Analysis of Variance
Source
DF
SS
MS
F
P
Regression
1
3576561334 3576561334 3.44431E+09 0.000
Error
65533
6805
0
Total
65534
357662938

Table 17. Slammer-Generated Fourth Octet Regression Analysis
The regression equation is
Slammer Generated = -0.517399 + 0.999 Statistically Generated
S = 0.332113
R-Sq = 100%
R-Sq(adj) = 100%
Analysis of Variance
Source
DF
SS
MS
F
P
Regression
1
357164896
357164896
3.23815E+09 0.000
Error
65533
7228
0
Total
65534
357172124
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The residual plots for the third and fourth octets, shown in Figures 20 and 21,
continue to illustrate the even uniform distribution of Slammer infection packets. The 4way residual plots display that the differences between the octets generated by Slammer
and the statistical model are uniform across the range of the octet address space. The
normal probability plot illustrates that the generated packets match the statistical line with
some small deviation at the tails approaching one percent. Both the fitted value and
observation order of the residuals show that there is an even distribution of differences
across the octet range, but as observed in the analysis of the second octet, visually there
appears to be some sinusoidal pattern to the octets generated. This sinusoidal modulation
is double the characteristics observed with the second octet with a +/- 0.50 difference in
the residuals. However, unlike the histogram of the second octet, the histogram of the
residuals for the third and fourth octets illustrate a more normally distributed pattern with
only a small indication of a flattened top. Although there appears to be a more
pronounced sinusoidal pattern in the fitted and observed residuals, the statistical analysis
of the regression data indicates that the data is statistically uniformly distributed.
The fitted line plots shown in Figures 22 and 23 demonstrate both visually and
mathematically that the last two octets generated by Slammer and the statistical model
are virtually identical. As shown previously in the analysis of the residual equation and
plots, the fitted line plot analysis shows the R-squared values to be a 100% match.
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Residual Plots for Third Octet
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Figure 20. Residual Plot for Slammer-Generated Third Octet
Residual Plots for Fourth Octet
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Figure 21. Residual Plot for Slammer-Generated Fourth Octet
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Fitted Line Plot
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Figure 22. Fitted Line Plot for Slammer-Generated Third Octet
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Figure 23. Fitted Line Plot for Slammer-Generated Fourth Octet
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From the data presented above, it is shown that the Slammer- generated third and
fourth octets are uniformly distributed across the octet range. The statistically generated
model and the Slammer- generated packets match to a point of virtual identicalness. This
proves that within the total range of IP and octet addresses, Slammer generates a
uniformly distributed set of random numbers for packet infection despite the pattern
anomaly observed in the lag plots.
4.3 Matlab Model Simulation of Slammer Routing Worm Operation
This first section compares the results of the Matlab model- generated infection
rates compared to the results presented by Zou to validate the Matlab model simulation.
It also compares the estimated infection doubling rate during the original Slammer worm
release versus the Matlab model infection doubling rate. Finally, this section compares
the Matlab model infection rate data from this experiment against the infection rate data
generated in the Wei research.
4.3.1 Validation of Matlab Model Infection Rate Simulation

A short visual comparison of the infection rates of the Code Red and routing
worms generated by Zou versus the Matlab model infection rates of those worms is
provided. A more detailed statistical comparison of the infection rates of original
Slammer worm and the “/8” routing worm is compared against the infection rate
generated by the Matlab model.
4.3.1.1 Code Red versus Routing Worms

Figure 24, the Code Red and Zou Code Red routing worm infection rates
generated by the Zou research and the infection rates generated by the Matlab model.
These infection rate models set the vulnerable systems at 360,000 and scan rate of 358
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packets per minute for each worm simulated [ZTG05]. Due to the size of the simulation
and the detailed analysis provided of the Slammer infection curves, these graphs are
presented as a visual example of the accuracy of the Matlab model of the infection rate.
The two charts show a similarity that indicates a strong correlation between the two
simulation models. These visual and numerical similarities based on the visual
comparisons of the two graphs validate the Matlab model of infection rate. This research
was limited to visual comparisons due the unavailability of the raw research data
generated by Zou.

Figure 24. Zou Code Red versus Matlab Model Code Red Infection Rates
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4.3.1.2 Original Slammer versus “/8” Routing Worm

The infection rate data for the original Slammer worm is based on an average
packet per second rate of 4,000 with 100,000 vulnerable systems [ZTG05]. The number
of vulnerable systems, 100,000, appears to be an arbitrary number chosen by Zou for
their research as it does not match the observed number of 74,856 systems infected
[MPS03]. According to their research, the Slammer routing worm was based on 3,108
pps with the same 100,000 vulnerable systems. The infection rate characteristics found
in their research are shown in Figure 25 [ZTG05].

Figure 25. Zou Slammer Worm versus Zou Slammer Routing Worm
The infection rate generated by the Matlab model for comparison to the Zou
research is run 20 times and a 95% confidence interval is provided. Each of these
infection rate curves uses the same factors of 100,000 vulnerable systems and an initial
number of infected systems of 10 hosts used by Zou [ZTG05]. The Matlab model
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generation of the Slammer routing worm infection curve is generated using the 3,108 pps
to account for the increased size of the infection packet [ZTG05]. For the Matlab model
generation of the original Slammer worm infection rate, the average of 4,000 pps
observed during its original release is used. The two infection rate curves are presented
in Figures 26 and 27. Additionally, a third Matlab model- generated infection rate curve
for the Slammer routing worm is presented in Figure 28 with a 95% confidence interval
over 20 runs with the packets per second set at 4,000. The average infection rate curves
from the data shown in Figures 26, 27 and 28 are combined into one graph presented in
Figure 29 to show the speed differences between the Matlab models.
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Figure 26. Matlab Model of Zou Slammer Routing Worm @ 3,108 pps
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Matlab Simulation of Original Slammer Worm @ 4,000 PPS with 95% CI
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Figure 27. Matlab Model of Original Slammer Worm @ 4,000 pps
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Figure 28. Matlab Model of Zou Slammer Routing Worm @ 4,000 pps
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Matlab Model of Zou Slammer Worm Versus Zou Routing Worm
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Figure 29. Matlab Model Composite of Slammer Infection Rates
As shown in Figure 30, the infection rate curve of the Slammer routing worm
presented by Zou and the Matlab model with the 3,108 pps do not match. However, the
Zou Slammer routing worm infection rate curve and the Matlab model with 4,000 pps
show a strong similarity. Based on this experiment, the simulation of the 3,108 pps
Slammer routing worm has a slower infection rate than the curve generated by the Zou
research. Therefore, the simulations shown in the graph by Zou were either completed at
the 4,000 pps, the description accompanying the graph is in error, or the infection rate
data generated was in error.
Using the validation from the Code Red and routing worm simulation graph
comparison and the similarities shown in the original Slammer worm infect rates, the
Matlab model- generated infection rate is validated. Furthermore, the observation that the
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Slammer routing worm infection rate presented by Zou was performed at the 4,000 pps
level provides one additional point of validation of the Matlab model simulations while
showing the graph in the Zou paper is in error.

Figure 30. Matlab Model Slammer Worms versus Zou Slammer Worms
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4.3.2 Matlab Model of Doubling Rate versus Observed Slammer Rate

The next step in validation of the Matlab model is to compare the Matlab model
simulation of the full Internet model with the actual numbers of Slammer vulnerable
systems against the observed rate estimated during Slammer’s original release. For
comparison to the “real world” observations, this experiment uses the standard 74,856
vulnerable systems with an average of 4,000 pps [MPW03]. Moore observed that a
single worm had the potential to infect 7 (+/- 1) vulnerable systems per second
[MPW03]. This translated to a global doubling rate of 8.5 (+/- 1) seconds which is used
to generate a doubling rate curve with upper and lower bounds set at 9.5 and 7.5 seconds
respectively [MPW03]. Within the Moore initial report, there is mention that this
doubling rate was calculated for the first minute [MPW03]. Each of the doubling rate
graphs presented below show the extension of that doubling rate to 216 , or 65,536 systems
infected, which is the largest doubling factor prior to exceeding the total number of
vulnerable systems. For clarity, a one minute reference line is provided on each of the
infection doubling rate graphs to illustrate the cut-off of the one minute estimate by
Moore [MPW03].
The Matlab model- generated doubling rate is presented in Figure 31 using, as
mentioned above, the original Slammer worm average of 4,000 packets per second as
observed in 2003. The confidence intervals are set at 95% for the Matlab modelgenerated Slammer infection doubling rate. The average doubling rate generated by the
Matlab model at a 95% confidence interval is 9.348 (+/0.763) seconds for the first
minute. This is a difference of 0.848 (+/-0.237) seconds from the estimate of the original
Slammer worm doubling rate. The estimate of the original Slammer worm infection
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doubling rate with the upper and lower bounds is presented in Figure 32 providing a
curve representing the estimated infection rate. Then finally for ease of comparison, the
estimated doubling rate of the original Slammer worm and the Matlab model-generated
doubling rate of the Slammer worm are plotted onto the same graph in Figure 33.
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Figure 31. Matlab Model- Generated Doubling Rate
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Figure 32. Slammer Doubling Rate
As the combined data shows in Figure 33, the estimated doubling rate of the
original Slammer and the Matlab model- generated doubling rate overlap for just over 140
seconds. This extension of the doubling rates beyond the one minute limitation shows
that when continued to their infection limits, the two rates eventually separate and shows
the original Slammer doubling rate completes the infection of the remaining systems
faster than the Matlab model-generated doubling rate. This indicates that the if the
original Slammer doubling rate remained within the bounds set by the original estimate
through the infection of the 65,536th system, the Slammer worm was faster than .
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Observed Slammer Doubling Rate vs Matlab Generated Doubling Rate
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Figure 33. Matlab Model versus Observed Slammer Doubling Rate
The closer view isolating the one minute limitation, shown in Figure 34, shows
that there is some significant overlap of the two doubling rates. The upper limit of the
original Slammer doubling rate average is contained within the lower confidence interval
of the Matlab model- generated doubling rate. The containment of the observed Slammer
doubling rate within the Matlab model until the 60-second point provides a further
indication that the Matlab model is valid. Further, the average of the original Slammer
worm doubling rate was faster than the average that could be expected if the original
Slammer worm was released more than once.
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Observed Slammer Doubling Rate vs Matlab Generated Doubling Rate
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Figure 34. Matlab Model versus Slammer Doubling Rate Detailed
Based on this experimental data, it is apparent that original Slammer worm
operated faster than the expected average case determined by the validated Matlab model,
to a point that it was always faster than the Matlab average and only contained inside the
upper (i.e., fastest) confidence interval at 95%. Thus, the research shows that the
original Slammer worm doubling rate, when originally released, operated faster than
could be expected with multiple instances of its release.
From the validation of this Matlab model by the estimated infection doubling rate
and based on the previous validation of the Matlab model by the comparisons to the Zou
research this model is validated using two methods. Therefore, the full Internet infection
rate of the Slammer Worm as calculated by the Matlab model simulations, and shown in
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Figure 35, can be considered a valid model of how the Slammer worm would operate on
a computing system in 2003.
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Figure 35. Matlab Model- Generated Slammer Worm 2003
This infection rate for Figure 35 is calculated using 74,856 vulnerable systems
with the original Slammer worm average of 4,000 pps at a 95% confidence interval over
20 runs. The data shows that over 70,000 vulnerable systems would be infected between
198.825 and 210.078 seconds with a 95% probability. This is over 93% of the potential
victims and it is well under the ten minute estimated during the original observation of
the Slammer worm infection. This estimate was calculated by using the number of scans
observed at the three minute point of Slammer’s original release and extrapolating the
expected time to scan 90% of the address space [MPW03]. Thus, this ten minute
estimate was not an actual measurement of systems infected at the ten-minute point.
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The conclusion that can be reached from this data is that while the Slammer
infection doubling rates are not exactly the same, the first minute doubling rates do show
significant overlap. The doubling rates are both exponential and only differ in their
estimation of the rate of infection.
The differences between the estimated time to infect 90% of the systems and the
Matlab model simulation in expected time for reaching the 90% level of infected systems
is larger than expected. However, there are several reasons that can be given as to why
this variation in the two data sets occurred. These include the admission by Moore in
their research that not all of the data sets they analyzed were sufficiently precise over that
initial short collection duration, which may have affected their analysis of how fast the
doubling rate occurred [MPW03]. The difficulties of collecting accurate data during the
original Slammer worm release were further exacerbated by an unexplained transient
failure at the 2 minute and 40 second point after Slammer’s release [MPW03]. The
ability to repeat the Matlab model simulation of the Slammer worm infection rate
provides a database from which to draw a more comprehensive statistical model than
does a single observation of the Slammer worm in the wild. This means that the data
estimates used by Moore to generate their results are but a single instance of how
Slammer acted. Slammer’s behavior would almost certainly have been different given
other releases.
4.3.3 Matlab Model versus Wei Slammer Infection Rate

The Slammer experiments run by Wei, covered how the Slammer worm would
react with differing traffic loads and network failures. Their research included a simple
baseline test with the 75,000 vulnerable hosts and 4,000 scans per second observed in
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2003. The baseline curve was presented with several other curves that showed the
Slammer worm operation with varying traffic loads and network failures as shown in
Figure 36 [WMS05].

Figure 36. Wei Slammer Worm Simulation
The Slammer infection rate generated by the Wei research closely matches the
curve generated of the Slammer worm infection rate by the Matlab model in this research
as shown in Figure 37. The Wei experiment follows the Matlab model’s lower
confidence interval through 50,000 systems infected. The lower confidence interval of
the Matlab model continues to closely match the Wei data until just past 65,000 systems
infected where Wei’s data makes an uncharacteristic deviation from a smooth curve.
Despite this top end deviation, the Wei data further supports the Matlab model of the
Slammer worm infection rate as an accurate representation of how the Slammer worm
behaves in the wild.
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Figure 37. Matlab Model Slammer Worm versus Wei Slammer Worm
4.4 Scanning Worms in a Computing Architecture of Today
Zou’s research used an arbitrary number of Slammer vulnerable systems set at
100,000 [ZTG05]. The actual number of potential victims is 74,856 [MPS03]. This
section takes the Zou experiment a few steps further by using the correct number of
vulnerable systems and analyzes the operation of the scanning worms in a 2003 and 2007
computing environment. Thus the number of vulnerable systems is set at 74,856 and
each of them are run with a 95% confidence interval and displayed separately.
Note however, that although the speed increase of the network alone is considered
here in this experiment, the increase in the number of vulnerable systems is not. For ease
of comparison, the vulnerable systems were left the same as any increase in the number
of potential victim systems reduces the non- vulnerable systems by an equal number.
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Thus, for every vulnerable system added above the 74,856 threshold the worm will
spread faster. For example, if the original Slammer worm using the 100,000 vulnerable
systems as used by Zou is compared to the infection rate using 74,856 vulnerable
systems where both are set at the average 4,000 pps as observed during the original
Slammer worm release [MPW03], the Zou infection rate is faster as shown in Figure 38.
Finally, because there is no basis of comparison in this research for the possible number
of vulnerable systems as there is for the speed of the scanning packets generated by the
Slammer code, the increase in vulnerable systems today is not be considered.

Zou Slammer Worm Versus Matlab Model Slammer Worm 2003
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Figure 38. Zou Slammer Worm versus Matlab Model Slammer Worm 2003
To provide a baseline for comparison, a Matlab model of the Slammer worm
infection rate average with an upper and lower confidence interval at 95% as it would act
in 2003 is provided in Figure 39. This Matlab model uses 4.3 billion available addresses
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in the scanning space, 74,856 vulnerable systems, and the average 4,000 pps for infection
rate curve generation. Hereafter, this worm is called the Slammer worm 2003.
The Matlab model of the average infection rate curve with an upper and lower
confidence interval at 95% of the Slammer worm as though the worm were released on a
system today is provided in Figure 40. Using the 4.3 billion available addresses, the
74,856 vulnerable systems, and an average of 14,398 pps found in this research the
Matlab model of the infection rate curve is generated. Hereafter, this worm is referred to
as the Slammer worm 2007.
The Matlab model average of the Slammer routing worm as it would have acted
in 2003 (Hereafter, the Slammer routing worm 2003) is presented in Figure 41 with an
upper and lower confidence interval at 95%. The Matlab model that generates this
infection rate curve uses 1.95 billion available addresses, the number of vulnerable
systems set at 74,856, and 3,108 pps as noted in the Zou research for the larger infection
packet size [ZTG05].
In Figure 42, the Matlab model used to generate the average with an upper and
lower confidence interval at 95% of the 2007 version of the Slammer routing worm uses
a rate of 11,187 pps to reflect the increase for operation of the worm on a computing
system of today. The number of vulnerable systems is set at the same 74,856 and 1.95
billion addresses available for scanning as the Slammer routing worm 2003. Hereafter,
this worm is referred to as the Slammer routing worm 2007.
Finally, the average infection rate of the Slammer worm 2003, Slammer worm
2007, Slammer routing worm 2003, and Slammer routing worm 2007 are plotted onto
one graph for ease of speed comparison in Figure 43. This graph shows that the infection
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rates of worms on a system of today are faster than their 2003 counterparts. Table 18
shows the variable settings for all of the 2003 and 2007 worms.
Table 18. Matlab Model Variables for 2003 versus 2007 Worm Comparison
Number of
Vulnerable
Systems
4,294,067,296
74,856
4,294,067,296
74,856
Number of IP
addresses

Slammer Worm 2003
Slammer Worm 2007
Slammer Routing
Worm 2003
Slammer Routing
Worm 2007

Number of
Iterations

Number
of Trials

10,000,000
10,000,000

20
20

1,946,156,941

74,856

500,000

20

1,946,156,941

74,856

500,000

20

Initial Number
of Infected
Systems
One
One
One
One
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Figure 39. Matlab Model- Generated Slammer Worm 2003
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Matlab Generated Slammer Worm 2007
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Figure 40. Matlab Model- Generated Slammer Worm 2007
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Figure 41. Matlab Model- Generated Slammer Routing Worm 2003
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Matlab Generated Slammer Routing Worm 2007
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Figure 42. Matlab Model- Generated Slammer Routing Worm 2007
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Figure 43. Matlab Model- Generated Slammer Worms and Slammer Routing Worms
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This experimental data shows that a Slammer-based worm released onto the
Internet of today is much faster than its 2003 counterparts. As shown in Table 19, the
increase in the infection of 90% of the potential victims for the two chronologically
separated worms are almost identical at 3.599 fold increase. This increase demonstrates
the quicker infection rate due to the faster infection packet generation rate.
Table 19. Matlab Model of 2003 versus 2007 Infection Rates
Worm Name

Infection Rate in Seconds

Slammer
Worm 2003

Upper CI

Average

Lower CI

203.34

197.69

192.04

Slammer
Worm 2007

Upper CI

Average

Lower CI

56.49

54.92

53.35

Slammer
Routing Worm
2003

Upper CI

Average

Lower CI

127.15

121.45

115.76

Slammer
Routing Worm
2007

Upper CI

Average

Lower CI

35.32

33.74

32.16

Infection
Rate
Increase

3.5995
Infection
Rate
Increase
3.5994

4.5 Single Slash Eight (SSE) Routing Worm
This section covers the Single Slash Eight (SSE) routing worm and the modeling
of its infection rate curve. The final portion of this section provides a comparison of the
SSE routing worm against the Slammer worm 2003, Slammer worm 2007, Slammer
routing worm 2003, and Slammer routing worm 2007.
4.5.1 SSE Routing Worm Creation

Taking the division of the Slammer routing worm one step further, the original
Slammer worm code is modified to become an SSE routing worm which scans only one
of the 116 “/8” IANA address spaces. The SSE routing worm is creation details are
available upon request
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4.5.2 Matlab Model of the SSE Routing Worm

The small changes to the original Slammer worm code discussed in Section 4.5.1
increase the size of the SSE routing worm from 404 bytes to only 412 bytes. Thus, a
2003 version of the Slammer worm with an average of 4,000 pps is changed to a rate of
3,922 pps for the 2003 version of the SSE routing worm. The 2007 SSE routing worm
packets per second is barely affected by the addition of only eight bytes and would slow
the generation of infection packet on an infected system from 14,398 pps to 14,118 pps.
An IP address space of 16,777,216 possible addresses is used to simulate the
address space an SSE routing worm is required to scan with the single CIDR “/8.”
Because the total address space is reduced, the total number of vulnerable systems is
reduced by equally dividing the 74,856 by the 116 available address spaces. This equates
to 645 vulnerable systems in each SSE routing worm range. Table 20 shows the
variables used in the generation of the infection rate curves by the Matlab model for the
2003 and 2007 SSE routing worms.
Table 20. Matlab Model Variables for SSE Routing Worm
Number of
IP
addresses
SSE
Routing
Worm

16,777,216

Number of Number
Initial Number
Number
Vulnerable
of
of Infected
of Trials
Systems Iterations
Systems
645

500,000

50

One

4.5.3 SSE Routing Worm Infection Rate Comparison

Figures 45 and 46 show the 2003 and 2007 SSE routing worm infection rate
curves with the accompanying 95% confidence intervals. The 2003 SSE routing worm
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infects over 90% of the vulnerable systems in under one minute. However, the 2007 SSE
routing worm infects over 90% of the vulnerable systems in under 17 seconds.
The speed increase of these two worms over their 2003/2007 Slammer worm and
2003/2007 Slammer routing worm counterparts is substantial as shown in Figure 47. The
SSE routing worm infect rates are aggregated across the entire population to provide a
proportional comparison in Figure 47.
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Figure 44. Matlab Model- Generated SSE Routing Worm 2003
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Matlab Model of SSE Routing Worm 2007
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Figure 45. Matlab Model- Generated SSE Routing Worm 2007

Figure 46. Matlab Model SSE Routing Worms versus Slammer Worms
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Table 21 contains the speeds at which these six worms infect over 90% of their
vulnerable systems.
Table 21. SSE Routing Worm Speed Comparison
Worm Name
Slammer
worm 2003

Infection Rate in Seconds
Upper CI

Average

Lower CI

203.34

197.69

192.04

Average

Lower CI

121.45

115.76

Slammer
Upper CI
Routing Worm
127.15
2003
SSE Routing
Worm 2003

Upper CI

Average

Lower CI

61.83

59.92

58.01

Slammer
Worm 2007

Upper CI

Average

Lower CI

56.49

54.92

53.35

Average

Lower CI

33.74

32.16

Average
16.65

Lower CI
16.11

Slammer
Upper CI
Routing Worm
35.32
2007
SSE Routing
Worm 2007

Upper CI
17.18

Overall, the data collected shows that the SSE routing worm was 3.299 times
faster than both the 2003 and 2007 Slammer worms. Additionally, the SSE routing worm
is also 2.027 faster than the 2003 and 2007 Slammer routing worms. Finally, the increase
in infection rate for the SSE routing worm from 2003 to 2007 is 3.6 times due to the
increase in infection packet generation rate.
4.6 Summary
The first section of this chapter covered the network configuration for all of the
experiments performed in this research and briefly covered the Slammer worm code used
as a basis for this experiment. The second section then delved into the results and
analysis discovered through this research.
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This chapter presents the results and analysis of the data collected from the
experiment simulations of the worm infections. Section 4.1 covers the collection and
analysis of Slammer’s packet per second generation. Section 4.2 examines the
randomness of Slammer’s IP address and octet generation. In Section 4.3, the Matlab
worm models are presented for comparison to the original Slammer worm and the routing
worm models proposed by Zou. The comparison of worm speeds possible on computing
systems of today versus those available in 2003 is provided in Section 4.4. Section 4.5
examines the infection rate of the original Slammer worm versus the SSE routing worm.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Restatement of the Problem and Conclusions
The primary focus of this experiment was to show that the variety of scanning
worms tested were faster than the original Slammer worm. Further, the experiment set
out to prove that the SSE routing worm was the fastest worm of its kind. Lastly, this
research examined whether the computing systems architecture of today would facilitate
a much more aggressive worm than has been observed in previous outbreaks.
This research found that despite an observable pattern of generation, IP addresses
produced by Slammer are in a uniform distribution across the address space. The
detailed examination of the IP address generation data set proved again, despite the
presence of an observable generation pattern, that the second IP octet generated by the
Slammer code for this experiment was also uniformly distributed across the address
space. Finally, the third and fourth octets were shown to have no observable random
number generation pattern, and they were uniformly distributed across their address
space.
After establishing randomness, the Matlab model simulations were compared to
and validated by the previously created infection rate models used by Zou for the Code
Red, BGP routing worm, “/8” routing worm, the original Slammer worm, and the
Slammer routing worm [ZTG05]. The infection doubling rate observed by Moore during
the original Slammer worm release and the research of the original Slammer worm
infection rate performed by Wei provided further validation of the Matlab model and
Slammer worm infection rate [MPW03] [WMS05]. During the validation of the Matlab
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model simulations, one of the experiment graphs provided by Zou was either an error or
notated incorrectly. The Zou Slammer routing worm infection rate curve was
significantly faster than what is expected for a worm operating with its characteristics.
However, the analysis of the Slammer routing worm as hypothesized by Zou proved to be
faster using the Matlab model simulations than the original Slammer worm.
The extension of this research to include the current speed of the computing
systems shows worms would be significantly faster on a computing network of today
than they were in 2003. The research showed that the worm infection rate for a worm in
2003 was increased by a factor of 3.6 times for a worm operating on a computing system
of 2007 due to the increased packet generation rate. This research has given strong
evidence that any scanning worm released on the architecture of today would cause even
greater harm to the Internet infrastructure through its speed of infection and network
congestion.
Finally, the new SSE routing worm is faster than any of the worms evaluated.
The SSE routing worm was more than three times faster than the original Slammer worm
and more than two times faster than the Slammer routing worm proposed by Zou. An
SSE routing worm released today would have an infection rate 3.6 times faster than if it
had been released in 2003 due to the faster infection packet generation.
5.2 Contributions and Significance of Research
This research has furthered the understanding of the operation characteristics of
scanning worms on an IPv4 network and laid the groundwork for future experiments into
live worm research. The routing worms proposed by Zou have been validated and
extended to an even faster version of routing worm illustrating that these worms pose a
96

great threat to the computing community and deserve further research. The expansion of
this research into the speed of the current computing systems architecture exposes the
fact that Slammer will most likely not remain the fastest worm and that there is a large
void in the analysis of worms on current architectures. Through the use of the actual
Slammer worm, a live host and a validated mathematical model, this experiment has
furthered the research proposed by others.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research
There is a large void in the research of live worms on a network. Due to the
problems incurred during the research of these worms several opportunities for future
research based on this preliminary research are available. The largest area for
continuation of research is to solve the issue of the auto-generated multicast address for
UDP packets generated by Slammer, which afflicted every IP address generated. Also,
the problem of modifying the Slammer assembly code to accept the changes required to
set the IP address field with the “hit list” values needs to be investigated. These two
problems may be related. Once these problems are solved many more research avenues
open up.
The observation and testing of live worms on a network is an area that could
validate many mathematical models currently in use by researchers worldwide. With the
speed of computing systems continually increasing, these models need current data
harvested from a live network to validate and ensure they incorporate the capabilities of
today’s systems. As shown in this experiment, the current architecture is significantly
faster than what was in place in 2003, which is the timeframe of when the majority of the
worm research is based.
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Finally, modifying the worms to operate on an IPv6 network and analyzing their
ability to propagate in that environment would be groundbreaking research.
Incorporating the increase in speed of computing systems, the capabilities of the routing
worms examined in this research and calculating the increase of vulnerable systems for a
given software vulnerability would provide a significant leap forward in the research of
self-propagating worms on an IPv6 network. While other researchers have made claims
that the conversion to IPv6 would all but eliminate the capability of a scanning worm to
propagate, the proof on an existing system with live worms and the characteristics of the
computing systems of today has yet to be completed.
5.4 Summary
This research has expanded the knowledge of the operation of scanning worms on
an IPv4 network and proved that the Slammer routing worm and SSE routing worm is
faster than any previously observed worm. The groundwork laid by this research
provides a solid foundation for future research into the area of live worms on a network.
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Appendix A
This appendix covers the hardware and software used during the research to
complete the experiment.
A.1 Experiment Hardware
The computers used to facilitate the experiment are Dell Latitude Laptops and
their specifications are shown in the Table 22. The specifications for the switch
connecting the laptops together are provided in Table 23.
Table 22. Experiment Computer Specifications
Victim Machine
Dell Latitude D620
2 GB 533 MHz DDR2 RAM
Intel Core Duo T2400 1.83Ghz
80 GB 5400 RPM HD
Broadcom NetXtreme BCM5752 Gigabit
Ethernet

Attacking Machine
Dell Latitude D600
512 MB
Intel Pentium M 1600 Mhz
30 GB 4200 RPM HD
Broadcom 570x Gigabit Integrated
Controller

Table 23. Port Switch Specifications
Linksys SD205 10/100 Switch (5-port)
10/100 Mbps
Category 5 Ethernet
5 x RJ45 ports
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A.2 Experiment Software
The software used in this experiment is detailed in the Table 24 including the
operating system version numbers.
Table 24. Experiment Software Versions
Microsoft Windows 2000 5.00.2195
Microsoft SQL Server 8.00194
Wireshark Network Analyzer 00.99.3
Netcat 1.11
Matlab 7.3.0 (R2006b)
Frhed 1.1.0
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Victim Machine
Victim Machine
Both Machines
Attacking Machine
Attacking Machine
Attacking Machine

Appendix B
This appendix covers in detail the code and operation of Slammer. The information
contained in this section is available upon request.
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Appendix C
This appendix describes the generation of the infection rate simulation by the
Matlab model used in this research.
C.1 Matlab Model Infection Rate Simulation Code
The code below was used to generate all of the worm infect curves for
comparison to the available data and previously described mathematical models. As
defined in the comments of the code “N” is set to be the total number of available address
for the scale of the test. The number of vulnerable systems was denoted by “n.” The
maximum number of iterations, which is converted to seconds for final analysis, is
represented by “M.” The value for “M” in these experiments is arbitrary as this
experiment considers the entire vulnerable system space and it is set to a number beyond
the expected infect iteration found by preliminary testing. Further, the code is set to
“break” out of the current trial when the number of potential victims reaches zero. Note
that there is an equal chance of any number being generated by the pseudo random
number generator (PRNG), thus the number of vulnerable systems is reduced by one
without regard to which number in the vulnerable range was guessed by the PRNG. “K”
represents the number of trials. The number of trials is an arbitrary value set high enough
to allow for the complete infection of all vulnerable systems. The Matlab code was set to
exit the current trial after the last vulnerable system was infected to decrease the time
between trails. The initial number of infected systems is represented by “I” and is
highlighted in the code provided below. Table 39 shows the values used for the
variations of the Matlab simulations.
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Table 25. Matlab Model Experiment Variable Values
N - # of IP
addresses

n - # of
Vulnerable
Systems

M - # of
Iterations

K-#
of
Trials

I - Initial #
of Infected
Systems

Code Red Worm

4,294,967,296

360,000 10,000,000

1

Ten

Zou Code Red "/8"
Routing Worm

1,946,156,941

360,000

500,000

1

Ten

Zou Code Red BGP
Worm

1,228,360,647

360,000

500,000

1

Ten

Zou Slammer Worm

4,294,967,296

100,000 10,000,000

20

Ten

Zou Slammer
Routing Worm

1,946,156,941

100,000

500,000

20

Ten

Slammer Worm
2003

4,294,967,296

74,856 10,000,000

20

One

Slammer Worm
2007

4,294,967,296

74,856 10,000,000

20

One

Slammer Routing
Worm 2003

1,946,156,941

74,856

500,000

20

One

Slammer Routing
Worm 2007

1,946,156,941

74,856

500,000

20

One

16,777,216

645

500,000

50

One

16,777,216

645

500,000

50

One

SSE Routing Worm
2003
SSE Routing Worm
2007
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***********************************************************************
% N is the total # of IP adresses
% n is the total # of potential victims
% M is the maximum # of iterations
% K is the number of trials
% I (highlighted) is the initial number of infected systems – this value needs to manually changed in the
%

code

function [TargetInfectTime,VictimInfectTime] = IPsim(N,n,M,K) %Designates the function for Matlab
TargetInfectTime=M*ones(1,K); %Creates M arrays of ones the size of K for storage of TargetInfectTime
infected=zeros(1,K); %Creates an array of zeros the size of K for storage of infected
VictimInfectTime=zeros(K,n); % Creates an array of zeros K by n for storage of VictimInfectTime
for j=1:K
n1=n; % Sets the upper limit of the vulnerable systems range equal to total number of potential victims
for i=1:M
IP = ceil(N*rand(1,(infected(j)+ I ))); % generates a random number in the range of N for each
%infected system and turns it into an integer
if sum(IP<=(n1+1))>=1 %if IP address is less than or equal to the upper value of the
% vulnerable systems enter loop
VictimInfectTime(j,infected(j)+1:infected(j)+sum(IP<=(n1+1))) =
i*ones(1,sum(IP<=(n1+1))); %Sets the time of infection for each IP address
%within the vulnerable system range, this check is
%performed multiple times if more than one is hit
infected(j)=infected(j)+sum(IP<=(n1+1)); %Increases the number of infected systems
n1=n1-sum(IP<=(n1+1)); %Reduces the number of vulnerable systems by number hit
end
if n1 == 0 %When number of Vulnerable systems reaches zero break
break
end
end
results=fopen('results.txt','w'); % Opens “results.txt” for writing of data
fprintf(results,'Number of Machines Infected %10.0f\n',infected); % Prints # Infected to file
fprintf(results,'Victim Infected %10.0f\n', VictimInfectTime'); % Prints Infect Time to file
fclose(results) % Closes “results.txt”
end
end

***********************************************************************
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Appendix D
This appendix contains a detailed breakout of a typical UDP header from a
Slammer packet. This information is available upon request.
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Appendix E
This appendix contains the detailed information for the creation of the SSE
routing worm as previously discussed in Section 4.5. The information in this appendix is
available upon request.
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